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CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION 
A survey conducted in 1990 found that 57 percent of respondents found compensation 
benefits to be a very important part of their employment decisions. Of this group, 63 percent 
found health insurance to be the most important of these benefits (Employee Benefit Research 
Institute 1991 ) . Although a large body of empirical research has focused on the interaction of 
non-monetary compensation and wages, no known formal empirical examination of the effects 
of own employer provided health insurance on labor supply exists. This study develops and 
tests a theoretical model of the effects of employer paid health insurance on the employee's 
hours of work decision. 
This chapter includes a brief introduction to the fundamentals of employer sponsored 
health insurance benefits plans, a comprehensive examination of health insurance coverage in 
the U.S. over the period 1982-1991, and a review of relevant empirical research. Chapter 2 
develops a theoretical and an empirical model to test the effects of own employer provided 
health insurance benefits on the hours of work decision. Finally, Chapter 3 reports the results 
from the tests of the empirical model. 
Fundamentals of Employer Provided Health Insurance Benefits 
Employee benefits are formally defined as payments for market work in a form other 
than monetary wages. They include legally required social insurance payments, payments for 
private insurance and retirement plans, payments for time not worked, extra cash payments, 
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and the cost of employee related services (Beam And Mcfadden 1985). The types of benefit 
packages available to employees are a function of individual, locational, occupational and 
industrial characteristics. 
Health benefit plans are generally offered in two forms through employers: prepaid 
plans and postpaid plans. Prepaid plans are similar to those offered through Health 
Maintenance Organization's (HMO). Payment is made in advance to the health care supplier 
fo r all allowable episodes during a period. Postpaid health plans pay the health care supplier 
after allowable services are performed on a single episode basis. The coverage of these plans 
range from basic hospitalization to comprehensive medical services (Salisbury 1985). 
There are three major sources of employer sponsored health insurance plans. Commercial 
insurance plans are the most common source of employer-sponsored health insurance. Under 
a commercial insurance plan, the premium payments are made by the firm and cover all costs 
associated with the administration and payout of the benefits. Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans, a 
second common form of firm health insurance benefits carrier, are much like commercial plans 
except greater limitations are generally placed on local choice of care administrator and 
geographic coverage. The third type of plan includes employers who self-fund employee 
health insurance benefits. 
Most firms that provide health insurance benefits cover all eligible employees under a 
single health insurance plan. Other employers have separate plans for union and nonunion 
members. Still others cover some workers but exclude others, most notably part-time 
employees. Many employer sponsored health insurance plans include provisions for the 
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coverage of dependents . Coverage under the plans generally takes effect immediately upon 
starting work or after a brief training period. COBRA polices allow continuation of coverage 
under an employer sponsored health insurance plan for a period after displacement. 
Payment necessary for employee inclusion in firm sponsored health insurance plans is 
generally made in the form of a payroll deduction. The percentage of the employee insurance 
premium paid by the employer varies from full payment to none whatsoever. Volume 
discounts available to firms allow substantial health insurance savings to employees even in 
cases in which the firm pays no part of the premium. 
Payment of health insurance claims are provided through several approaches: service, 
indemnity, or a combination of the two. The service approach provides total payment for the 
cost of covered services. The indemnity approach pays up to a fixed-dollar amount for 
services. In recent years the service approach has become the most popular (Beam And 
Mcfadden 1985). 
Virtually all employer sponsored health insurance plans have restrictions designed to 
limit their use. The most common is a requirement that individuals contribute a copayment 
when making a claim on their medical insurance. The requirement of a deductible payment 
places a cost on each claim for the users of medical services. The use of deductibles and 
co-insurance assures the users of medical services face some marginal cost for health care use. 
In addition, caps are sometimes placed on the frequency of covered medical visits during a 
time span. Maximum limits are sometimes placed on the reimbursement for specific services 
or episodes of care (Salisbury 1985). Further restrictions are al.so made on the types of 
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conditions covered and the liability of payment for treatment of preexisting conditions (Luft 
1981 ) . 
Review of Health Insurance Coverage 1982-1991 
This section examines the changes in health insurance coverage over the period 
1982-1991 . First, the data source is discussed. Second, the relative costs associated with 
medical care are examined. Third, the sources of coverage for those covered by health 
insurance are explored. Last, the socioeconomic characteristics of the insured are examined. 
Data Sources 
The March Supplement of the Current Population Survey from the years 1982-1 987 
and 1989-1991 was the exclusive source of data used to compile the statistics on individual 
insurance coverage in the United States. The 1988 March Supplement file was excluded 
because of coding errors in the data file. Every year approximately 60,000 households and 
150, 000 individuals are included in the survey. It is conducted on a monthly basis with the 
March survey containing a larger range of information. 
Due to periodic changes in the nature of the survey questions and methodology used in 
weighting the sample, there are some minor inconsistencies in the data set over time. The 
majority of changes took place between the 1987 and 1988 samples. In 1988, the sample was 
expanded to cover additional information on children under 15 and the methodology used in 
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weighing the sample was revised (Levit 1993). Information on the aggregation mechanism 
utilized is contained in Appendix D. 
Costs and Expenditures 
During the period 1982-1990 there has been a consi.stent increase in the cost of 
medical care in the U.S .. Several measures reflecting this increase are reported in Table 1.1. 
The cost of personal health care has increased 76 percent over this period. Also, the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) of medical care costs has increased at a 36 percent faster rate 
than that of the general price index. The percentage of GNP attributable to national health 
care expenditures rose from 10.3 percent in 1982 to 12.8 percent in 1991. The percentage of 
disposable income spent on medical care increased at a slightly faster rate from 10. 7 percent in 
1982 to 13 .6 percent in 1990. 
Employer-sponsored health benefits are increasing as a share of total employee 
compensation. In its annual survey of business, the U.S. Department of Labor Statistics found 
that in 1984, 5.8 percent of compensation was in the form of health insurance benefits. By 
1990, the level had grown to 7. I percent. In Table 1. 2, the percentage of employees and their 
dependents receiving health insurance benefits are reported to be increasing at a rate far less 
than that of health care costs. Also, the employers' share of the costs associated with 
employer provided health insurance has been decreasing. Therefore, it is likely that most of 
the increase in compensation costs attributable to health insurance benefits is a result of 
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Table 1.1. National Health Care Price Statistics 1982-199 1. 
Year Fixed Weight Ratio of CPI National health Medical care Business Health 
Spending as a 
Percentage of 
Labor 
Compensationd 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
Price Index 
For Personal 
Health Caren 
73 .7 
79.2 
85 .0 
91.1 
95.4 
100.0 
106.2 
11 3.6 
121.3 
129.8 
Medical Care expenditures as expenditures 
Expenses to percentage of as percentage 
CPI All Itemsb GNPC of disposable 
incomec 
1.00 10.3 10.7 
1.05 10.5 11.0 
1.07 10.3 11.1 
1.10 10.5 11.4 
1. 16 10.7 11.8 
1.19 10.9 12.5 
1.22 11.2 12.8 
1.26 11.6 13 .0 
1.29 12.2 13 .6 
l.36 12.8 N/A 
N/A 
N/A 
5.8 
6.1 
6.3 
6.2 
6.5 
6.9 
7.1 
N/A 
Source: a\ Health Care Financing Review, Health Care Financing Administration, Office 
of the Actuary, Fall 1991 . 
b\ U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI Detailed Report, January 1992. 
c\ U.S. Health Care Financing Administration, Office of the Actuary, 1991. 
d\ U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI Detailed Report, 
vanous issues. 
increasing costs, as opposed to increasing incidence of employer sponsored health insurance 
coverage. 
Sources of Health Insurance 
During the period 1982-1991, there was virtually no net change in the percentage of 
the U.S. noninstitutionalized population covered by health insurance. As shown in Table 1.2, 
the percentage of the noninstitutionalized populati.on covered by health insurance in 1982 was 
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Table 1.2 Percentage of Health Insurance Coverage by Source 1982-1987, 1988-1991. 
Persons Covered by Public Persons Not 
Year Sample Total Private Health Insurance Health Covered by 
Total Employer Other Insurance Health Insurance 
Related 
1982 Total 87.4 73 .1 59.4 14.8 21.6 13.7 
Employed 86.8 83 .9 76.9 10.8 7.4 13 .2 
1983 Total 87.7 72.3 58.5 14.6 22.8 14.6 
Employed 86.6 83 .9 76.9 10.7 7.5 13 .2 
1984 Total 86.6 71.6 59.0 14. l 22.5 15.2 
Employed 86.6 83 .8 75.5 12.9 7.2 13.4 
1985 Total 86.1 70.9 60.3 14.2 22.6 15 .8 
Employed 86. I 83 .1 74.8 13.0 7.4 13.9 
1986 Total 86.2 71.2 60.1 14. l 22.8 I 5.7 
Employed 86. I 83 .1 75.2 12.4 7.4 13.9 
1987 Total 86.3 71.4 61.2 14.3 22.9 15.6 
Employed 86.1 83 .2 75.5 11.9 7.4 13.9 
1989 Total 86.9 72.7 62.3 14.5 22.8 15.2 
Employed 86.2 83 .1 74.0 11 .0 7.4 13.8 
1990 Total 86.5 72.4 61. 1 14.5 22.6 15.6 
E mployed 86.2 83.2 73 .8 11.2 7.4 13.8 
1991 Total 86.1 71.1 61.0 14.4 23.4 15.9 
Employed 85 .7 82 .5 73 .0 10.9 7.6 14.3 
Source: Current Population Survey, March Supplement, 1982-1987, 1990-1 991. 
87.4 percent. During the period l 982-1991 there was a decrease in coverage to 86. J percent. 
Although, there has been little change in the percentage covered, the number of individuals in 
the U.S. covered by health insurance has increased from 152 million to 168.6 million during 
the period 1982-1 99 1. 
The incidence of health insurance coverage of the employed has decreased slightly 
during the period 1982-1 991 . The high during the period of 86 percent occurred in 1982. 
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The low for the period was 8 5. 7 percent in 1991. The actual number of employed persons 
covered by health insurance has covered has grown by 1.4 million during the period. 
However, the proportion of the employed who receive health insurance through their 
employers has declined from 76.9 to 73 percent. It can be concluded that the increase in job 
growth during this ten year period was predominantly in sectors or positions which have a 
lower incidence of employer-provided health insurance benefits. 
Table 1.3 shows the distribution of employer sponsored health insurance by coverage 
and employer contribution. As noted before, the percentage of employees receiving health 
insurance through their employers has declined steadily during the period 198J-1991 . The 
earlier tables included employees who paid for their benefits without any firm contribution. If 
firm sponsored benefits are defined to be only those in which the firm pays part of the 
insurance cost, the decline in the proportion of employed receiving benefits is even greater. 
The percentage of employees receiving firm-sponsored group health insurance declined from a 
high of 62.9 percent in 1982 to 57.0 percent in 1991. In numerical. terms, the total number of 
employees included in firm related health insurance benefits plans increased by 2.2 million, but 
total employment increased at a faster pace than total employees receiving benefits. The 
percentage of dependents covered own-employer-sponsored health insurance plan of an 
individual decreased from 36.5 percent in 1982 to 34.5 in 1991. Thus, the decline in 
employer-sponsored dependent insurance has declined by two percentage points as opposed 
to the nearly six point drop in the percent of employees insured by their employer. 
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Table 1.3 Percentage Distribution of Employee's and Their Dependents Receiving 
Employer Provided Health Insurance 1980-199 1. 
Total Group Total Own Employer Contribution Dependents 
Year Health Coverage to Employee Insurance Covered by 
Coverage AJI Part None Employee's 
1982 77.4 62.9 28 32 2.9 
1983 76.9 62. 1 27.6 31.6 2.9 36 
1984 75.5 60.9 26.7 3 l.2 2.9 34.9 
1985 74.8 60.3 25.8 31.8 2.7 34.3 
1986 75.2 60.6 25.4 32.4 2.8 34 
1987 75.5 60.6 24.9 32.7 3 34.2 
1989 74.0 57.6 22.9 31.7 3 35.6 
1990 73 .8 57.5 21.6 33 .1 2.7 35.1 
1991 73 57 20.4 33 .6 3.1 34 .5 
Source: Current Population Survey, 1982-1987, 1989-1991 . 
The primary reason for the smaller drop in dependent coverage by employer sponsored 
health insurance compared to employee coverage is most likely a combination of three factors . 
First, a large number of the jobs created during the period were either part-time or jobs in the 
retail and service sectors; jobs which typically provide lower levels of health insurance 
coverage. Secondly, it may be that these jobs were filled disproportionally by the young, 
single and childless persons who are least interested in benefits. Last, the increasingly higher 
cost of providing health benefits may have caused fewer new employers to provide benefits. 
This may have led those with dependents to self-select toward employers that provide health 
benefits packages that cover their dependents. 
10 
When examining the portion of group health insurance paid by the firm, it becomes 
evident that firms are shifting away from fully sponsored-employee health insurance towards 
partial or no sponsorship. ln 1982, firms made one hundred percent of the contribution for 
28.0 percent of those employed or 44.1 percent of all those included in firm-sponsored health 
insurance plans. By 1991 , workers covered fully by firms dropped to 20.4 percent of all 
employees or 35 .8 percent of all covered employees. During the same ten year period, the 
percentage of those receiving partially paid firm sponsored health insurance increased from 
32.0 percent to 33 .6 percent of those employed, or from 50.0 to 58.9 percent of those 
included in own firm group health plans. The percentage of individuals enrolled in firm 
sponsored health insurance programs in which the firm made no contribution was 3 .1 percent 
in 1991 and 2.9 percent in 1982. In 1991, these arrangements represented 5.4 percent of all 
covered workers, a slight increase from 4.6 percent in 1982. 
Table 1.4 shows the distribution of employed persons included in own employer 
provided health insurance plans by the industry of longest period of employment last year. A 
large amount of variation between industries is evident. The lowest proportions of employees 
receiving employer sponsored health benefits are in agriculture, forestry and fisheries. Only 
about 20 percent of those employees receive employer-sponsored health insurance. Other 
industries with relatively low proportions of employees receiving health insurance benefits are 
in retail trade, and business and professional services. The industries that traditionally have 
had the highest incidence of employer sponsored group health insurance are government and 
the industries which traditionally have strong unions. The mining, manufacturing and 
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Table 1.4. Percentage of Individuals Receivi ng Own Employer Provided Health 
Insurance by Industry 1982-1991 . 
Year 
Industry 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 1990 199 1 
Agriculture. forestry 21.8 23.0 2 1.4 22.5 23 . l 21.3 20.3 2 1.8 20.7 
and fi sheries 
Mining 84. l 83.3 84.0 75.4 82.1 81.7 76.l 79.3 79.3 
Construction 58.5 56.4 54. l 50.0 52. 1 51.2 47.2 47.2 44.7 
Manufacturing 81.6 82.3 80.8 78.6 80.6 77.8 76.2 75.0 74 .6 
T ransportation, 
commw1ication and 8 1.1 80.3 79.5 76 .5 78.4 77A 74.9 74.2 73.5 
public utilities 
Wholesale 73.3 72.2 7 l.6 69.8 70.5 71.0 67.5 64 .1 65 .5 
Retai I trade 38.8 37.8 38.4 36.5 36.8 38.0 32.5 33.5 32.0 
Finance, insurance 69.4 7 1.6 72.0 69.1 70.5 69.6 68.0 64.2 65.4 
and real estate 
Business and 36.0 35.6 35.8 35.2 35.2 38.3 35.7 38.3 36.8 
professiona l services 
Professional services 56.4 56.8 57.0 57 . l 58.6 57.8 54.0 54.1 54 .2 
Government 69.5 70.0 71.8 69.7 69.5 71.6 69. 1 69.5 66 .5 
Total 58.3 57.6 57.3 56. 1 56 6 56 .5 53 .7 53 .5 5 l.4 
Source: Current Population Survey, March Supplement, 1982-1991. 
infrastructure-related industries show the highest level of employer sponsored health 
insurance. 
The general trend across all industries is a decrease in the incidence of 
employer-sponsored health benefits. The one exception is in the case of business and 
professional services which has been increasing over the past decade. The decline is 
particularly dramatic in transportation, construction and manufacturing, industries that have 
faced increased international competition or deregulation. These industries also had the 
largest decreases in union density during the J 980's (Freeman 1988). 
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Table 1.5. Percentage of Individuals Receiving Own Employer Provided 
Health Insurance by Number of Labor Hours Supplied 
Average Hours Per Single Single 
Week When Males Females 
Working 
1-10 
11-20 
21-30 
31-35 
36-40 
41 + 
Total 
12.90 
21.50 
30.46 
46.45 
70.85 
75 .30 
68.63 
9.52 
20.12 
37.65 
73.40 
88.05 
88 .51 
70.23 
Source: Current Population Survey, March Supplement, 1984, 1987, 1990. 
The djstributions of the incidence of employer provided health insurance among single 
males and singles females by hours average hours of work per week for are reported in Table 
1. 5. In both the male and female samples, the incidence of employer provide health insurance 
is found to be positively related to hours of work. The incidence of health insurance benefits 
for the first thirty hours of work is similar for males and females. Both show a significant 
increase between trurty and forty hours of work. After, thirty hours of work the incidence of 
females receiving employer-provided health insurance is sigruficantly higher than that of males. 
This large disparity may indicate self-selection of females into positions which include health 
insurance benefits in the compensation package. 
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Table 1.6. Percentage of Individuals Covered by Health Insurance by Race, Urban Area, 
Education and In.come, 1982- 1987, 1989-1991. 
Year 
Category 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 1990 1991 
Total Insured 87.4 87.7 86.6 86.1 86.2 86.3 86.9 86.5 86.1 
Sex 
Male 85 .7 86.7 85.7 84.8 85.0 85.3 85.9 85.4 85.0 
Female 88 .0 88.8 87.8 87.4 87.5 87.5 88.1 87.7 87.6 
Race 
White 88.2 88.4 87.9 87.2 87.4 87.6 88 .3 87.8 87.3 
Black 82.9 82.9 78.9 79.6 79.5 78.2 81.1 79.8 79.0 
Other 80.9 82.6 81. 1 80.6 81.0 81.9 80.9 80.6 81.8 
Urban Area 
MSA 88.5 88.1 87.0 86.4 86.5 86.5 87.1 86.7 84.2 
Non-MS A 84.5 86.8 85.7 85.3 85.2 85.6 86.1 85.8 83.6 
Education 
(Years) 
12+ 85.9 85.8 85.3 84.9 85.1 85 .2 86.5 86.5 86.8 
16+ 90.1 90.5 90.2 90.9 90.4 91.2 91.4 91.6 92.0 
Age 
0-5 82.6 82.7 81.8 80.4 80.5 81.5 80.2 78.9 79.6 
6-18 82.4 81.8 80.7 79.6 80.0 79.8 80.5 79.8 79.3 
19-24 75 .2 72.8 70.0 69.2 70.1 69.7 74.7 74.0 72.8 
25-34 86.9 85 .5 84.5 84.0 83 .6 83.4 82.6 81.6 79.5 
35-64 89.0 88.6 87.9 87.4 87.2 87.6 88.0 87.5 87.0 
64+ 98.4 98 .5 98.8 99.0 99.1 98.7 99.0 98.9 99.0 
Source: Current Population Survey, March Supplement, 1982-1987, 1989-1991. 
Characteristics of the Insured 
Table 1.6 shows the distributions of individuals covered by health insurance by sex, 
race, location of household, education, and age. Women, whites, the elderly and the highly 
educated consistently had disproportionally higher rates of health insurance coverage than did 
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other groups during the decade spanning from 1982 to 1991 . In 1991 , 87.6 percent of 
noninstitutionalized women were covered by health insurance compared to 85.0 percent of 
men. Whites were more likely to be covered by health insurance than other races. In 1991 , 
87.3 percent of whites were covered by health insurance while only 79.0 percent of blacks and 
81. 8 percent of all other races combined were covered. Coverage rates have been declining 
for whites and blacks, while other races have experienced increasing coverage rates. 
AJthough the discrepancy in ethnic insurance coverage may reveal some cultural relationship 
in preference for health insurance, it is likely further analysis would reveal that a majority of 
the differences are related to socioeconomic conditions. 
In 1991 after a decade of nearly consistent growth, 86.8 percent of high school 
graduates and 92.0 percent of those having completed at least four years of college were 
covered by health insurance. Those with lower levels of educational attainment showed lower 
coverage rates. 
When examined by age group, the population has a consistent life-cycle of insurance 
coverage rates. From birth to age eighteen, the proportion of the population covered by 
health insurance is nearly constant: Because this is a snapshot of current conditions as 
opposed to cohort analysis, equal incidence of health insurance coverage by age indicates that 
dependent children are insured by their parents regardless of age. The nineteen to twenty-four 
year old age group consistently had the lowest incidence of being covered by health insurance. 
It should be noted that the reported increase in coverage ratios for this group between 1987 
and 1989 was in part due to modifications in CPS defined incidence of coverage. After 1987, 
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individuals over the age of twenty-two living outside the household were considered covered 
if they had coverage under a parent's health insurance policy (Levit, Olin and Letsch 1992). 
After the age of twenty-four, proportional health insurance coverage steadily increases as age 
increases. Essentially all noninstitutionalized residents aged 65 or o lder are covered by health 
insurance. It should be noted that the consistent levels of greater than ninety-eight percent 
health insurance coverage for those above sixty-four is primarily due to the virtually automatic 
inclusion in Medicare. 
Table 1. 7 shows the distribution of health insurance coverage of individuals by 
household current dollar income. There has been a downward trend in the percentage of 
noninstitutionalized individuals covered by health insurance with household incomes of under 
fifty thousand. The opposite is found for individuals with household incomes above fifty 
thousand . The use of nominal income measures two distinct factors: changes due to inflation 
of income and real coverage changes by income group. It is interesting to note that the 
coverage of individuals with household income of under twelve thousand dollars has been 
stable fo r the entire period. This is most likely due to the efficiency of government-sponsored 
health insurance programs. 
This section has reviewed insurance coverage of persons in the United States over the 
period 1982- 199 1. The incidence of health insurance coverage has decreased during this 
period. More specifically, it has been shown that the percentage of those receiving employer 
sponsored health insurance has also been decreasing. 
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Table 1.7. Percentage of Individuals Covered by Health Insurance by Household 
Income, 1982- l 987, 1989-1991 . 
Year 
Category 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 1990 1991 
0-12499 73 .0 72.1 73 .7 73 .0 72.7 72.9 73 .0 72.7 73 .6 
12500-19999 77.1 79.2 80.3 79.3 78.1 77.7 75.3 73 .9 73 . l 
20000-25999 84.2 89.5 87.0 84.4 84.0 83.9 81.7 80.3 78.1 
26000-34999 87.1 92.1 90.1 88.3 88.2 87.5 87.2 85 .5 84.0 
35000-44999 90.4 92.3 91.6 91.1 90.5 90.1 89.8 89.2 88.3 
45000-74999 89.5 91.9 91.9 91.5 92.2 91.3 92.8 92 .5 91.3 
75000 + 85 .6 90.7 91.2 90.7 90.5 91.2 93.6 92 .7 93.3 
Total Insured 87.6 87.5 86.6 86. I 86.2 86.3 86.9 86.5 86. 1 
Source: Current Population Survey, March Supplement, 1982- 1987, 1989-1 991. 
Literature Review 
No empirical research has been found on the direct or indirect effects of employer 
provided health insurance benefits on the hours of work decision. Therefore, this literature 
review is utilized to review studies involving research on different aspects of theory utilized in 
the theoretical and empirical models. 
Robert Rice ( 1966) laid out the fundamental advantages of fringe benefits as: 1) 
preferential treatment under federal personal and corporate income tax law; 2) savings made 
possible by group purchase of benefits, notably insurance; 3) control of labor turnover. 
Winkler (1991) found that the provision ofMedicajd had sigruficant negative effects 
on the probability of the average single female household head showing positive hours of 
work. She concluded that the structure of the Medicaid program, which terminates all 
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benefits to those individuals reporting positive hours of work, was the primary disincentive to 
participation in market work. To maintain work incentives, an individual must receive 
compensation at a level great enough both to replace the value of the Medicaid benefi ts lost 
and to pay for the value of the individual's lost leisure time. 
Leibowitz and Chemew ( 1992) studied the factors that affect the probability that a 
firm will o ffer health insurance to its employees. They found that after controlling for 
premium rate variation, insurance coverage increases with firm size at a decreasing rate. 
Firms in urban areas were as likely to offer health insurance as rural firms. Firms with a 
significant proportio n of workers earning low earnings were less likely to offer health 
insurance benefits. They conclude that the primary reason small firms do not ofter health 
insurance is due to prohibitively high premium costs. 
Long and Marquis (1992) found that young families are much less likely to purchase 
private health insurance than those headed by someone over the age of forty. They found that 
approximately half of all individuals covered under group health polices would not purchase 
private health insurance if not offered through their employer. The primary reason found for 
this is a price di sparity between the cost of employer-sponsored and privately purchased 
insurance to the employee. They found that a decrease in the price of employer-sponsored 
benefits would increase employee demand by six percent, which is consistent with similar 
studies (Holmer 1984, Taylor and Wilensky 1983, Farley and Wilensky 1984). Their results 
were tempered by the inability to predict family future health expectations based on observable 
site, demographic or even health characteristics. 
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The Equalizing Differences Hypothesis is that, other things being equal, a desirable job 
characteristic can compensate for an undesirable job characteristic. Woodbury (1983) 
concludes that studies based on the labor-leisure model are biased due to the use of wages as 
the sole measure of worker compensation. He estimates that the elasticity of substitution 
between wages and fringe benefits consistently exceeds unity, indicating wage supplements 
are easily substituted for money wages. Using Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data, he 
estimated the elasticity between wages and fringe benefits to be 3.5 using a homothetic 
specification and l .7 using a non-homothetic specification. Using Census of Government 
data, Woodbury obtained an elasticity estimate between wages and a broadly defined measure 
of fringe benefits of 7.7. Using a more narrowly defined composite fringe benefit consisting of 
only life and health insurance, he found the elasticity of substitution between wages and fringe 
benefits to be 1.6. His findings suggest that fringe benefits are good substitutes for wages. 
Lester (1967) found that workers in union plants seem to have stronger preferences 
for benefits than do workers in nonunion factories. He concludes that unions find it easier to 
negotiate increases in compensation in the form of benefits as opposed to wages for the 
workers. He cites the ease of acceptance, convenience, security and the automatic nature of 
employer-sponsored benefits programs as the primary attractive features to workers. Further, 
in a survey of industrial workers, Nealy (1963) found that workers prefer the addition of 
health benefits over an equivalent dollar value increase in wages. 
Duncan (1976) found that the well-documented, pervasive effect of education in the 
determination of pecuniary benefits also carries over to the determination of nonpecuniary 
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benefits. When pecunjary and nonpecuniary benefits are combined in a composite 
compensation measure, education has a larger effect on compensation. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, the fundamentals of employee health insurance benefit packages were 
outlined, the coverage of health insurance was discussed and relevant research was reviewed. 
In the next chapter a theoretical model of the effects of employer provided health insurance on 
the hours of work decision and empirical estimation model are introduced. 
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CHAPTER TWO. MODEL 
Theoretical Model 
The neoclassical model of the family assumes that the family allocates its time to 
maximize family welfare (Becker 1981 ) . In the simplest form, all family members are assumed 
to share the same set of preferences. A more realistic assumption is that the dominant 
member or members of the household impose a set of preferences and reward the 
nondominant members with a greater joint budget set than the individuals could attain alone. 
These incentives induce nondominant family members to allocate their time and other 
resources in accordance with the production decisions of the dominant member (Fallen and 
Verry 1988). This study will assume that family economic decisions are executed in this 
manner. 
In this model, the hours of work and compensation decisions are assumed to occur 
simultaneously. The level of compensation for market work available to an individual is a 
function of the individuals human capital, current labor market conditions and the number of 
hours the individual decides to work. An individual wilJ engage in market work if the 
perceived or actual value of the last hour of non-market time is less than the compensation 
available for that time spent engaged in market work. Participants in market work will supply 
labor hours as long as the value of goods that can be purchased using the additional 
compensation from market work is greater than the marginal value oftime spent not engaged 
in market work. 
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The simplest labor supply models represent compensation from market work entirely 
in the form of wage income. This compensation structure ignores nonmonetary 
compensation which now represents over one quarter of all labor compensation paid in the 
U.S. (Hart 1984). Ignoring nonwage compensation can bias the results of empirical studies of 
individual behavior if these individuals do, in fact, receive varying amounts of nonrnonetary 
compensation. Such studies will underestimate total compensation fo r individuals receiving 
nonmonetary compensation, while exaggerating the relative compensation for those 
individuals who receive only wage compensation. With the addition of non.monetary 
compensation, the marginal value of additional market work becomes the sum of the increase 
in monetary and nonmonetary compensation received. Although, this study focuses on the 
effects of own employer sponsored health insurance on hours worked, the theory presented is 
representative of most forms of nonrnonetary market work compensation as applied to labor 
supply decisions. 
The addition of employer sponsored health insurance packages to compensation 
measurement expands the decision process of firms and workers. Firms are faced with 
developing a compensation mix that will minimize the cost of hiring labor hours. Workers 
must identify a compensation mix that maximizes the benefit of hours of labor supplied. As 
the percentage of nonpecuniary labor compensation increases, satisfactory job search should 
be observed to be more difficult, manifesting itself in longer search and longer tenure once the 
search is successful (Klerman 1992). 
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The value of a benefits package in the labor supply decision is measured by the 
marginal value it has on the compensation package in the context of tbe household preference 
set. The wage-equivalent value of a benefits package is measured by the predicted market 
value of the services provided to each household unit, not the market value of a comparable 
package. The degree to which an individual will substitute wages for employer-provided 
health benefits is predicated on the value of health insurance benefits to the household. An 
individual with little concern for health benefits will tend to select employment with firms in 
which health benefits are a small proportion of the total compensation. Individuals with a 
strong taste for health care will seek out firms which economize on monetary compensation in 
order to offer more generous health benefits. 
To the extent that individuals differ in their tastes for benefits versus wages, 
individuals will self-select into positions of employment based on the proportion of 
compensation devoted to health benefits. This allows a firm to affect the characteri stic types 
of workers in its applicant pool by altering the mix of benefits and wages available to 
employees. For example, assuming individuals with children are more willing to sacrifice 
monetary income for health coverage than similar individuals without children, offering health 
benefits would tend to attract more workers with dependent children. Similarly, married 
individuals may have more interest and willingness to sacrifice monetary compensation for 
employer sponsored health insurance benefits than single individuals, leading to a 
disproportional share of married applicants at firms providing benefits. However, since 
compensation is a function of wages and nonmonetary income, an individual is not precluded 
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from accepting a compensation package that contains health insurance benefits which have no 
value to him or her if the wage component is sufficient to maximize utility. 
Job selection based on compensation mix is further complicated by the presence of a 
spouse in the work force. Both the wife and husband are then faced with the decision of 
which type of compensation mix to accept. This decision is expanded to three credible 
compensation goals : neither individual trading wage income for additional benefits, each 
individual trading a portion of their wage income for benefits; or only one individual trading 
wages for benefits for the household while the other specializes in maximizing wage income. 
The model might incorporate the level of spouse health insurance benefits as an exogenous 
influence on the current short-run labor supply decision, or as a jointly determined 
endogenous variable. 
For this study, firms will be assumed to follow the standard assumptions of profit 
maximization. This structure requires that firms pattern compensation in a manner that is 
consistent with minimizing labor costs (Varian 1984). Adding health insurance benefits to 
worker compensation packages is consistent with this goal for four primary reasons, 
including: 1) avoidance of tax liability associated with paying pecuniary wages to employees; 
2) differentiation of compensation packages from those of other firms; 3) as a large purchaser 
of health insurance benefits, the firm can obtain insurance packages at a lower per unit cost 
than employees; and 4) manipulation of employee behavior (Rice 1966). This study 
concentrates on the first and fourth reasons. 
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Because provision of individualized health benefits packages for each employee would 
be prohibitively expensive, it can be assumed that each employee faces a uniform benefits 
package available to each worker of the class employed by a specific firm. Firms are assumed 
to implement certain restrictions to control costs and prevent abuse of this type of benefit plan 
by employees. Assuming medical services are normal goods, these policies should reduce the 
use medical services by holders and subsequently reduce the value of these policies to them by 
increasing the marginal cost of each claim. 
The costs associated with the distribution of monetary compensation to employees 
include wage distribution, tax payment, and administrative costs. Tax payments made by 
firms on wage compensation are generally proportional to the total wage bill. Taxes 
associated with monetary compensation of labor hours by firms include social security, 
unemployment insurance and workers' compensation (Hart 1984). A proportional tax 
structure assures that as monetary compensation increases, the total tax burden on taxable 
compensation never decreases. 
Adding health insurance benefits to a compensation package increases the fixed cost 
associated with employee compensation to employers . As evidenced in the studies reviewed 
in Chapter 1, employees are willing to accept a reduction in wages in order to receive 
additional benefits, thereby sharing a portion of the cost of those benefits. Further, since 
benefits are generally not taxed, the cost to firms of benefits provision is partially subsidized 
by the tax savings generated through the lower level of wage compensation (Farley and 
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Wilensky 1984; Feldstien and Freidman 1977; Entoven 1984). The total tax savings to the 
firm is a positive function of the degree to which benefits can be substituted for wages. 
The salary savings and the subsidy from the reduction in monetary compensation can 
be seen most easily by referring to the graphical analysis of the individual budget constrajnt 
represented in Figure 2.1 . Hours of work are measured from right to left on the horizontal 
axis and the dollar value of income is measured on the vertical axis. To simplify the analysis, 
it is assumed that the firm and each employee place the same monetary value on the benefits 
package (B) and both compensation schemes have the same average level of compensation at 
the maximum number of hours available for market work and leisure (Hr hours) . Vis total 
income not received as compensation for market work. The cost to the firm of providing a 
-
compensation package that only involves wage payments, is equal to (1 +t)*Wnb *H (line aCnb 
), where W nb is equal to the wage rate with no health insurance benefits in the work 
compensation package, H is the number of hours worked and t is a flat proportional tax 
representing all taxes paid by employers on employee wages. The employee receives 
compensation net of taxes equal to Wnb*H, so the firm's cost exceeds the worker's 
compensation by the taxes paid. The dollar value of the tax burden is equal to t*Wnb or the 
vertical distance between the employer cost of compensation (line aCnb) and the level of 
compensation received by the employee (line aI ) . 
It is assumed that there exits a threshold number of hours that must be worked before 
an individual is eligible to receive own employer sponsored health insurance coverage (H3 
hours). As will be shown, the threshold number of labor hours allows firms to manipulate 
employee behavior. Further, it is assumed that employees enroU in health insurance programs 
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Figure 2.1 Individual budget constraint and firm cost for compensation 
packages including and excluding firm sposored health insurance 
benefits. 
when these benefits are offered. Long and Marquis ( 1992) found that nearly ninety percent 
of individuals enrolled in employer sponsored benefits programs when available. A point of 
discontinuity is created in the budget constraint at the threshold number of hours when health 
insurance benefits are added to the compensation package. This forces analysis of the budget 
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constraint in two parts: one in which the threshold number of hours of work needed to receive 
benefits has been reached and one for which it has not (Pudney 1992). 
As mentioned above, it is assumed that employers can lower the wage rate when they 
introduce compensation plans that include employer sponsored health insurance benefits. Let 
Wb be the wage rate associated with a compensation package which includes health insurance 
benefits provided to all employees who work a threshold number of hours (Hu) or more. The 
level of compensation received by employees who work at a level of hours below the 
threshold H 8 is W b *H (line ab), where H is defined as above. The firm's labor cost for 
providing compensation to an employee working a number of hours below the threshold (0 to 
Hshours) is (1 +t)*Wb *H (line ab). The compensation level received by an employee who 
works at a level of hours above the threshold required to receive employer provided health 
- - -
insurance benefits (Hs to H F hours) is (Wb *H) + B (line dl ). The cost to the employer of 
providing that compensation is [(1 +t)*Wb *H] + B (line eC1> ). 
The cost of the health insurance package to the firm is partially offset by the tax 
savings from the reduction in wage compensation at all levels of hours of work. At each level 
of hours, it is equal to the dollar cost of the insurance package minus the net tax savings on 
the lower wage payment, or equivalently B - t*H*(W
0
b-Wb). This effective tax subsidy leads 
to some interesting results regarding the most favorable type of compensation package in 
terms of firm cost at different levels of hours. 
At levels of hours below the threshold number required to receive benefits (0 to H s 
hours), the compensation package containing health insurance benefits is less expensive to the 
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firm than the package consisting solely of wage compensation. This is assured by the 
assumption that the wage associated with strictly monetary compensation (W
0
b) is greater than 
the wage in the mixed compensation package (Wb). At labor hours equal to or greater than 
the threshold (HB to HF hours) the relative cost of providing health insurance versus paying 
wages onJy becomes less obvious. If the cost of the benefits package is greater than the wage 
savings and the tax subsidy, B > (1 +t)*H*(W
0
b-Wb), the compensation package with health 
- -
insurance benefits will be more expensive. In Figure 2.1, this is true for hours H s to H 1 . If 
the cost of the benefits package is less than the wage savings and the tax subsidy, then B < 
(1 +t)*H*(W
0
b-WJ , and it will be less expensive for the firm to provide the benefits package. 
- -
This is true for hours H 1 to HF in Figure 2.1. 
In addition to labor compensation per individual, firms have the additional task of 
minimizing the total compensation for all labor hours employed. To that end, the firm must 
choose the value of the health insurance package and the hours restrictions associated with the 
eligibility to receive those benefits to correspond to its profit maximizing goals . Because the 
cost of providing health insurance benefits increases with the degree of heterogeneity, the firm 
will want to select a specific level of benefits and threshold hours restrictions to apply to all 
similar jobs. 
To illustrate the potential effects of firm provision of health insurance on the choice of 
total labor hours supplied by individuals, the economic decision making process of households 
must be added to the analysis. The neoclassical labor-leisure model framework will be used to 
examine the effects of the incidence of own employer provided health insurance on labor 
supply. Several simplifying assumptions can be made without significantly affecting the 
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analysis . First, leisure time will be defined as encompassing all time spent not engaged in 
market work. Second, home goods and market goods will be considered to be 
indistinguishable. Third, savings will be considered a good, thus income and , goods and 
services are equivalent. Last, individuals are assumed to be able to assess their expected 
medical expenses at the time of employment or renegotiation of contracts. The economic 
decision can represented by the utility function: 
Uj = F(LJ, Y, t) 
where L' is individual j's leisure time; Y is a composite commodity good; a and 1 is household 
taste. It is maximized subject to the following constraints: 
v :s; cj + vj 
and, 
where CJ is compensation from market work; y i is total income from sources other than 
market work; HF is total time avai lable for work; H1 is hours of market work performed; and 
aU other variables are as previously defined. The price of a composite good is normalized to 
be one. Compensation (C1) decomposes into monetary and nonmonetary income received 
from market work, defined as Cj = WjHj + Bi, where W1 is the wage received; and B1 is the 
do llar value of nonpecuniary compensation. Maximization of the utility function subject to the 
time and consumption constraints yields the labor supply function: 
A convenient method to explore the effects of different compensation packages on 
labor hours suppli ed is to define one compensation package as the initial condition and 
examine the effects of replacing it with another condition. The initial condition shalJ be 
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defined as the combination of goods and leisure which maximize utility on an individual 
budget constraint in which the compensation package fo r market work consists solely of 
monetary wages From this condition, the effects of changing compensation for market work 
to a mixed package containing monetary wage payments and employer provided health 
insurance will be explored. The cost of the health plan is assumed to lower the wage paid so 
that average compensation is equal across the two payment schemes. The primary behavioral 
response of interest in this study is hours of work supplied. 
In adding the household utility maximization framework to the previous discussion, it 
is useful to emphasize that firms and workers may not place the same value on the health 
insurance package. It is assumed that the individual faces two compensation types of equal 
average value at the maximum number of hours available for work (Hi:). One package 
consists of only wage payments. The other consists of a mix of wage payments and health 
insurance benefits . The utility function of each individual wi ll be assumed to be continuous 
and increasing over the relevant range of leisure and market goods. The marginal utilities of 
market goods and leisure are assumed to be continuous and diminishing. 
There are five interesting possible effects of such payment plans on the hours of 
market work supplied. Depending on the ci rcumstances, switching to the health insurance 
compensation plan can increase hours, decrease hours, induce labor market entry, induce labor 
market exit, or leave hours unchanged. 
An individual will supply the same positive number of hours of work under both 
compensation packages in only two cases. The first is when the value of the firm-provided 
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health insurance benefits to the individual exactly compensates for the reduction in wage 
income. The second is when utility maximization occurs at the maximum available hours of 
work. Because neither case is likely, there will be no further discussion of them. 
Figures 2.2 through 2.5 illustrate the four remaining possibilities. In each of the 
figures, two indifference curves representing an individual's preferences for leisure time and 
market goods are mapped onto the budget constraint developed earlier. U"b is the indifference 
curve tangent to the utility-maximizing combination of goods and leisure, subject to the 
budget constraint with wage only compensation. Ub is the indifference curve that passes 
through the utility maximizing combination of goods and leisure, subject to the compensation 
package consisting of both wages and health insurance benefits. 
In all four figures, the individual budget constraint is as outlined in Figure 2. 1. Income 
(1) is measured on the vertical axis and is assumed to be equivalent to the value of all 
purchased market goods including savings. Nonmarket work income (V) is assumed to be 
positive and constant across all schemes. The horizontal axis measures hours of work from 
right to left, and conversely, hours of leisure from left to right. The threshold number of 
hours of labor supplied in order to be eligible for own employer sponsored health benefits is 
-
Ho . Health insurance benefits have a fixed value. 
Figure 2 .2 illustrates the case in which the addition of health insurance benefits induces 
entry into the labor force . Initially, utility maximization occurs at zero hours of market work 
or HF hours of leisure consumed when faced with the wage only compensation package. 
This occurs at point a on the wage only budget constraint represented by line al . With the 
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Figure 2.2 Inducement oflabor supply by adding firm sposored health 
insurance benefits to the compensation package 
addition of health care benefits, the budget constraint is transformed to abel , and utility 
maximization occurs at a positive number of labor hours supplied. In Figure 2.2, the new 
optimum is shown by point eat Hb hours of work. Generally, for a marginal increase in the 
number of hours of labor supplied, the wage rate for must be greater than the value of that 
same increment of time spent engaged in leisure activities. The assumption of a threshold 
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number of labor hours supplied to be eligible to receive employer-sponsored health insurance 
benefits assures that the marginal increase in hours oflabor supplied must at least meet that 
threshold . Therefore, to induce entry, the increased value of the compensation package at the 
threshold number of hours, Ib-V must be greater than the value of leisure time foregone in 
order to work the threshold number of hours (I LI> - V). 
Entering the labor force and supplying at least the threshold number of labor hours 
necessary to receive health benefits under the alternative compensation scheme will occur if 
one of several conditions exist. First, health insurance benefits may have a very high value to 
an individual , thus increasing the marginal value of work by an amount sufficient to induce 
work at the threshold number. Secondly, high barriers to personal entry into the labor force 
may be present. Inclusion of employer provided health insurance benefits to the compensation 
package may induce an individual to provide positive labor hours. 
It is possible that an individual would work under a compensation package consisting 
of only wage payments and not work when faced with a compensation package that includes 
health insurance benefits. This possibility, illustrated in Figure 2.3 is predicated on the 
assumption that the wage rate available in a compensation package that contains health 
insurance benefits is less than that of a compensation package without health insurance 
benefits. An individual willing to supply positive labor hours, if offered the wage 
compensation package, may find that the value of health insurance benefits is not sufficient to 
compensate for the lower hourly wage. This is particularly likely for individuals who would 
work relatively few hours if offered the pure wage compensation package. The extreme case 
in which switching to the benefits plan causes the individual to drop out of the labor fo rce is 
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Figure 2.3 Exit from the labor force when own employer sponsored health 
insurance benefits are added to the compensation package of an individual 
initially working at levels below the threshold number of hours necessary 
to qualify for reception of the benefit 
illustrated in Figure 2.3. Utility maximization under the compensation package containing no 
health insurance benefits occurs at positive number of hours worked. This is shown as the 
point (f) of tangency between the indifference curve U"b and the wage only budget constraint 
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illustrated by line al at H nb hours of work in Figure 2.3 . The decrease in wage rates from W nb 
to W b associated with the switch to the compensation package including own employer 
provided health insurance benefits changes utility maximization to zero hours of market 
work. ILiustrated in Figure 2.3 as the point (a) tangency between the indifference curve Ub 
and the budget constraint abel in Figure 2.3. Note that this result is possible only in cases in 
which utility maximization under the wage only compensation package occurs at a number of 
hours below the minimum necessary to be eligible for health insurance benefits under the 
alternate scheme. Only individuals in this range of work hours will receive a lower level of 
compensation at each level of hours worked that will result in a lower level of maximized 
utility. In general, the more hours the individual works under the pure wage compensation 
scheme, the less likely is it that switching to the mixed wage-benefits package will result in 
labor market exit. 
It should be noted that individuals with preferences such as those in Figure 2.3 will not 
accept the benefits package, preferring the pure wage compensation package. Therefore, 
these individuals will self-select into jobs that offer no benefits but higher wages. If universal 
employer-provided health benefits are mandated such part-time jobs will not be available. In 
that situation individuals will opt to leave the labor force rather than work part-time at the 
lower wage. 
It is also possible that an individual will be willing to supply more hours when 
switching to a compensation package that includes health insurance benefits. Figure 2.4 
illustrates this case for an individual whose initial hours of work are below the threshold 
number of hours needed to receive benefits (Ha). An individual subject to the wage only 
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Figure 2.4 Increase in labor supply when own emp.loyer sponsored health 
insurance is added to the compensation packeage of an individual 
initally working at levels below the threshold number of hours necessary 
to qualify for reception of the benefit 
compensation will increase hours from an initial level that is below the minimum necessary to 
receive health insurance benefits under the alternate compensation package that includes 
health insurance benefits if the value of the mixed compensation package (lb) is high enough to 
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compensate for the lower wage rate and the additional leisure hours foregone (Lnb-Ls ). This 
is illustrated by the increase in hours from the utility maximizing l\b hours of work at Point g 
in Figure 2.4 when subject to the wage onJy budget constraint al to Hn hours of work at Point 
-
e when subject to the mixed compensation budget constraint abdl . 
The final possibility that will be explored is the case in which the number of hours of 
work supplied subject to the initial wage onJy compensation condition are greater than the 
threshold level necessary to be eligible for health insurance benefits under the alternate mixed 
compensation package. Switching to a mixed compensation package has a pure income effect 
reducing hours of work as well as a substitution effect reducing hours of work. Figure 2.5 
illustrates the reduction in hours from Hnb hours at the budget constraint and indifference 
curve tangency Point h to H 8 hours at tangency point e. This condition holds for all initial 
hours levels above He . 
The illustrations above do not exhaust all possible reactions to the inclusion of 
employer provide health benefits. However, the basic possible reaction have been addressed. 
The impact of instituting health benefits will tend to reduce hours worked for individuals 
working more than Ha hours, but will increase hours worked for individuals who work below 
-
Hshours. Workers whose utility is not increased by the mixed compensation policy will chose 
part-time jobs witb no benefits. In the following section a model is constructed to empirically 
test the effects of own employer provided health insurance benefits on the labor supply 
decision. 
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Figure 2.5 Reduction in labor supply when own employer sponsored health 
insuance is added to the compensation packeage of an individual initially 
working at a level of above the threshold number necessary to be eliglible 
to qualify for reception of benfits under the alternate package. 
Empirical Model 
The empirical measure of labor supply utilized in this study is annual hours of work. 
Individuals will be considered wage work participants if they have positive hours of work in 
the past year. The labor supply decision is considered to be part of a simultaneous system 
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involving wages and benefits. The structural econometric model of labor demand and supply 
is summarized in the equations below. 
The Structural Econometric Model for Labor Demand: 
Wage Equation 
In Wj = XjK{v1 + Lkjw2 + PJdwJ + Rkjw4 + a.jwBj + µj if Cj > CjR (2.1) 
where Wj is the deflated hourly market-wage rate of the j-th individual; X1 is a vector of 
personal characteristics including measures of individual skill; L is a vector of local prices, 
amenities, and tax features; P is vector of predicted business cycle measures; R is a vector of 
business cycle shocks; C1 is the total monetary value of compensation; dR is the dollar value 
reservation compensation for thej-th individual ; K{v0 (n= l-4) and a.{1,1 are vectors of unknown 
parameters to be estimated; ujw is a random disturbance term. The log-linear framework is 
widely accepted and conforms to the stylized facts concerning human capital investment and 
life-cycle earnings (Willis 1986). 
Benefits Equation 
B~ = xj~B l + L~B2 + p~B3 + ~135M +~~In wj + µh if cj > Ck (2.2) 
where B~ is the dollar equivalent value of own firm provided health insurance benefits of the 
j-th individual, given employment; Mis the price of health care; Kiwn (n= l-3,5) are vectors of 
unknown parameters to be estimated; µj8 is a random disturbance term. Due the unavailability 
of the actual monetary equivalent value of own employer health benefits received, the level of 
benefits equation will be restructured into a probit model estimating the probability that an 
individual will receive benefits. The predicted probability of receiving benefits will be used as 
40 
a proxy for the more desirable monetary equivalent value of employer provided health 
insurance. The resulting demand-side structural labor demand health insurance benefit 
equation can be written: 
and is defined as the previous health insurance benefit equation, except BJ is the probability of 
receiving own employer provided health insurance and G0 is a normaUy distributed probit 
function. Because this is an alternative form of the log-linear demand equation with benefits 
rather than wages used as the dependent variable, one would presume that the same signs of 
the personal characteristics would be observed in (2.3) as in (2. 1 ) . 
The Structural Econometric Model for Labor Supply: 
lnHj = x jidi11 + Lidi,2 + sidii6+ d,1nwj+ a {,Bj + µL if Cj > dR (2.4) 
where In Hj is the natural logarithm of the actual hours of work supplied by the j-th individual, 
given employment; S is a vector of nonwage household characteristic variables, including 
asset income; k{1n (n= l ,2,6), ~JH , and a{1 are unknown parameters; and µ{1 is an unknown 
random disturbance term. 
Observance of wage information for an individual is predicated on the market value of 
the individual's time (CJ) being greater than their respective reservation compensation (C{J. 
The monetary value of the reservation compensation for an unmarried individual can be 
modeled as: 
d R = x jc,jl + LE,~ + SE,~ + PE,~ + R(,j5 + QC,~ + roi (2 .5) 
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where Q is a vector of variables which affect labor supply entry but not marginal choices of 
hours of work, and all other exogenous variables are as previously defined; ~~ (n= 1-6) are 
unknown parameters to be estimated; and IDj is a random disturbance term. 
Because the observed values of the endogenous variables are not from a random 
sample of the population, but rather a sub-sample conditioned on the choice of positive hours 
of work, the conditional mean values of the disturbance terms of the labor demand (µjw ,~Ljn) 
and labor supply equations (µjH) potentially have nonzero expected values. This is known as 
selection bias (Heckman 1980; Killingsworth and Heckman 1986). Selectivity bias can be 
corrected by including an estimate of the conditional expectation of the disturbance terms for 
each individual as an explanatory variable in the regression equations. 
A two stage approach developed by Heckman (1980) is the common approach for the 
correction of selectivity bias of this sort. In the first stage, the probability of observing 
positive values of the endogenous variable is fitted to a univariate normal distribution. From 
the predicted results, the Inverse Mill's ratio (A.) is generated for each individual in the sample 
In the second stage, the labor supply and labor demand equations are estimated over only 
those individuals showing positive hours of market work, using A. as an additional regressor to 
correct for the nonzero value of the conditional mean. An estimate of the probability of 
observing compensated market work can be represented by a probit model of market work 
participation: 
Pr[Cj > C~] = Gp(Xj aj1 + La~ + Pa~+ Ra~+ Sai5 + Wa~ + ~1t) (2 .6) 
where all exogenous variables are defined as before; a{1's (n= l-6) are vectors of unknown 
parameters; GP is a univariate normal probability distribution; and µt is an unknown random 
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disturbance term. The corrected empirical labor demand and supply equations are: 
Labor Demand 
(2.7) 
(2.8) 
Labor Supply 
where k~n , k~11 , ki~n (n= 1-6), l:j; and C:j; are unknown parameters to be estimated as in the 
uncorrected equations; Ojw , ok, and 8{i are unknown parameters for the correction term /.) to 
be estimated; and µj; , µ~ , and µ~ are the new disturbance terms having expected conditional 
means of zero. 
Since wages and health insurance benefits are assumed to be jointly determined, 
estimation of the corrected structural demand equations can be achieved in two stages. First, 
selectivity bias corrected reduced form equations of the wage, incidence of health insurance 
benefit, and hours of market work supplied are fitted to the subsample of observations 
containing positive reported hours of work. The wage (ln Wj) and hours oflabor supplied 
(In H j ) equations are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) and the incidence of health 
insurance benefits equation is estimated by Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) probit. 
The empirical reduced form of the labor supply and demand equations are: 
Labor Demand 
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Labor Supply 
lnHj = Xj8{11 + L8112 + P8{n + R8jH4 + M8{is + S8jH6 + 8{~ /.) +a{, 
where all exogenous variables retain their previous definitions; eZvn ' ejwn and ' e{vn ( n = 1-6) 
are non-linear combinations of the parameters of the structural equations (See Appendix A for 
algebraic relationships). In the second stage, the structural labor supply and demand 
equations are estimated replacing the actual values of the wage (lnWi) and incidence of 
employer provided health insurance benefits (Bl) on the right hand side of the equations with 
the predicted values from the reduced form equations. 
Estimation Methodology 
This section outlines the methodology of empirical parameter estimation. First, the 
data and the sample are defined. Second, the specific empirical measures of the conceptual 
variables used in the estimation are defined and their predicted relationships to the dependent 
variables are discussed. Last, the estimation procedure is discussed. 
Data 
The primary data source for this study is the March Current Population Survey (CPS) 
Public Use Tapes for 1984, 1987, 1990. It consists of a sample of80,000 households for each 
year, containing data on occupational, demographic and personal characteristics. All 
information on personal and household characteristics is obtained from this source. All other 
sources of data utilized are outlined in Appendix C. A sample was drawn from the CPS tapes 
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consisting of unmarried 23 to 64 year-olds receiving no transfer payments or other reported 
nonmonetary local, state and federal aid. Those residing in Alaska and Hawaii were excluded 
from the sample. The sample also excluded those presently attending school and those with 
positive reported proprietary income and farm income. Further, households considered to be 
group quarters were excluded . From the resul.ting sample, only the primary member of the 
household was considered. The sample is taken from the 1984, 1987, and 1990 CPS tapes, 
thereby allowing for preference evolution and business cycle effects. Two types of household 
units are identified by sex of head: (1) single male; (2) single female. Households headed by 
married couples are not considered in the empirical analysis. 
The final sample consists of 5389 single male headed households and 5102 single 
female headed households. The 1984, 1987 and 1990 samples of consisted of3285, 3959, 
and 3589 males respectively. The 1984, 1987 and 1990 female sample consisted of 3285, 
3959, and 3589 individuals respectively. Starting at a random starting point within the first 
100 observations, one of every two individuals in the samples was selected for estimation. 
The 1984, 1987, 1990 subsamples consists of 1633 males and 1726 females, 1970 males and 
1838, and 1786 males and 1707 females respectively. The total CPS sample sizes are similar 
for 1984 and 198 7. Therefore, the relatively large number of males and females meeting the 
above criteria in 1987 is assumed to be a function of factors other than sample size. 
Accordingly, the sample size is reflected in the 1987 in the final subsample. 
All monetary measured variables are valued in log base e form. This specification is 
used to free the set of the importance of unit measure, thus facilitating use of the parameters 
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Table 2.1. Mean Values and Descriptions of Variables 
Mean values 
Variables (Std. dev. in parenthesis) Description of variables 
Males Females 
Endogenous 
LNWAGE 1.947 l.70 1 Log of average wage last year 
(0. 790) (0.756) 
BENEFIT 0.711 0.729 Incidence of own employer 
(0.560) (0.626) provided health insurance 
benefits 
LNHOUR 7.221 6.956 Log of hours of market work 
( 1.6 15) (2.006) last year 
Exogenous 
AGE 33.566 36.312 Age 
(10.179) (11 .394) 
AGE2 -1230.3 1448.4 Age squared 
(784.80) (907.09) 
HGA 13 .902 13.928 Highest grade attended in 
(3 .1 19) (2.9034) School 
HGA2 202.98 202.43 HGA Squared 
(80.536) (75 .883) 
HGA*AGE 463 .32 497.86 Highest grade attended times 
(170.12) (172.26) Age 
LNSTEARN 2.143 2.11 0 Log of state average 
(0. 133) (0.133) non-supefVlsory 
manufacturing wage 
LNPLAND 6.865 6.823 Log of the state average price 
(0.741) (0. 709) of improved farm land 
METRO= I 0.759 0.709 MSA residence located within 
(0.428) (0.454) incorporated city 
TAX 16.792 16.814 Average federal, state and 
(1.679) ( 1.694) local income tax by state 
PEMPSTAT 0.954 0.924 Engaged in market work last 
(0.209) (0.265) year 
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Table 2.1. (continued) 
Mean values Description of variables 
Variables (Std. dev. in parenthesis) 
Males Females 
PURATE 6.725 6.773 Predicted state unemployment 
(1 .300) (1 .308) rate 
RURATE 0.155 0.244 Unemployment shock 
(1.467) (1.506) 
PJOBGRO 2.121 2.106 Predicted state job growth 
(1.031) ( 1.054) 
RJOBGRO 0.130 0.066 State employment growth 
(2.244) (2.206) relative to U.S. 
LNDAYHOS 6.095 6.056 Log of average daily community 
(0.231) (0.251) hospital cost per patient 
LNASVAL 9.156 9.115 Log of non-wage earned income 
(0.250) (0.237) 
HKIDSU6 0.045 0.091 Own children under the age of 
(0.259) (0.355) SIX 
BLACK= J 0.102 0.155 Black racial heritage 
(0.302) (0.362) 
HPERSONS 1.647 1.815 Number of related persons in 
(1 .259) (1 .277) household 
NEREGION=1 0.264 0.261 Residence in northeastern region 
(0.439) (0.439) 
SREGION= l 0.284 0.290 Residence in southern region 
(0.454) (0.454) 
WREGION= l 0.253 0.239 Residence in western region 
(0.427) (0.427) 
LAMBDA 0.0941 -0.007 Inverse Mill's ratio from the 
(0.070) (0.023) probability of being observed 
employed in market work 
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as elasticity measures. This action does not alter the correctness of the models structure 
(Willis 1986). 
Certain cautions regarding the data set source should be mentioned. First, over the 
period of the study there have been revisions to the questions and to the interpretation of the 
answers on the CPS survey. Care was taken in structuring the data to avoid any 
inconsistencies in the variables. In 1988, the weighting system of the relationship of the 
sample to entire population was revised. Therefore, each individual in the sample was given 
an equal weight which assures that the sample will not be perfectly random because certain 
groups are over sampled during collection of the data. Also, state level data is used as the 
source of information on local conditions. Because of the variability in size and heterogeneity 
in population characteristics, state level data may inaccurately refl ect conditions faced by 
individuals within the state. 
Variables 
The mean values and compartmentalized definitions of the variables are reported in 
Table 2.1. The empirical measure of labor supply is the natural logarithm of annual hours of 
wage work (LNHOURS). Hours of wage work is derived by multiplying the CPS "weeks 
worked last year " by average hours of work per week." The logarithm of mean hours of 
work for those working in the sample is 7.22 1 for males and 6.956 for females . Jn levels, this 
converts to 1367 hour per year for males and l 049 hours per year for females. 
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The wage rate (WAGE) for an individual is defined as CPS "total earnings from wage 
and salaried work" divided by Hours. The real wage is obtained by deflating the nominal 
wage by the National Consumer Price Index. LNW AGE is defined as the natural logarithm of 
WAGE. The average logarithmic wage of those with positive hours of work reported in the 
past year is 2. 11 for single males and 1 .92 for single females . Because of the definitional 
relationship between LNHOUR and LNW AGE, any measurement error which exists in the 
LNHOUR variable and subsequently the wage variable will result in biased parameter 
estimates (Killingsworth 83). Because both HOURS and WAGE are treated as stochastic 
variables the problems of measurement error should be of little consequence in this study 
(Mroz 1987). 
The measure of employer provided health benefits (BENEFIT) is derived from the 
CPS variables "does your employer provide health benefits coverage", "how much of the cost 
does the employer pay", and "who else is covered by this plan". As previously mentioned, the 
information on the provision of health care benefits in the CPS data set does not assign a 
dollar value to firm provided health benefits, so the incidence of own employer provided 
health insurance is used. Individuals considered covered by benefits include all employed 
individuals receiving firm sponsored health insurance which is at least partially subsidized by 
the employer. Individuals that are covered under group health plans through their firm, but 
with no employer contribution are excluded. Also, no differences across individuals in the 
scope of the employer's share of coverage were measured due to limitations in the data set. In 
particular, there is no way to determine if the presence of dependent care coverage paid for by 
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the firm exists unless the individual actually has dependents. Therefore, the presence of 
dependent coverage may be due to supply-side characteristics of the household rather than 
demand-side choice of on the scope of insurance benefits. 
The predicted value of the wage equations are used as proxies fo r the actual wage 
rate, due to the simultaneous nature of the wage and incidence of health insurance benefits 
determination as well as the labor supply decision. Over 70 percent of all working men and 
72.9 percent of working woman in the sample received own employer provided health 
msurance. 
The relationship between wages and employer provided health insurance benefits is 
predicated on two primary interactions. First, the willingness of labor force participants to 
sacrifice a portion of their wage income in order to receive employer provided health 
insurance benefits. As previously stated, provision of employer the income effect of employer 
provided health insurance benefits enables firms to pay lower wages and still attract 
employees. Earlier discussion also suggests that firms are partially induced into providing 
health insurance benefits to avoid tax costs associated with monetary wage compensation. 
Because of the progressivity of the income tax structure, the incentive to shift toward 
nontaxable compensation increases as monetary income increases. Higher wages may be 
associated with higher levels of health insurance benefits. If the tax avoidance relationship is 
stronger than the wage tradeoff effect in the empirical estimation, employer provided health 
benefits may have a positive estimated effect on wages. Similarly signed effects should be 
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obtained by regressing the incidence of own employer provided health insurance benefits on 
the marginal wage rate (LNW AGE). 
The effect of the predicted wage (LNW AGE) on the hours of work decision is 
dependent on the nature of the individual labor supply curve and the individuals' position on it. 
Leisure time and the composite basket of goods and services are assumed to be normal goods. 
If the income effect of a wage increase is smaller than the substitution effect of the wage 
increase, then the individual will consume less leisure. In this case, the individual is on an 
upward sloping portion of the labor supply curve, and an increase in the wage rate would 
cause an increase in labor hours supplied. An individual may also decrease labor hours in 
response to an increase in the marginal wage rate if the income effect is larger than the 
substitution effect. The increased income will allow the individual to purchase more goods 
and services at the same number of hours worked. Several studies have fou nd that single 
males are on a backward bending portion of their supply curves while the opposite is found 
with single females . 
As discussed in the theoretical framework, the behavioral labor supply reaction from 
the inclusion in an employer's health insurance plan (BENEFIT) is dependent on the current 
number of hours worked and the value of the health insurance to the individual's household. 
The empirical variables used to describe individual characteristics include: years of 
school attended (HGA), years of school attended squared (HGA2), age (AGE), age squared 
( AGE2) and black racial status (BLACK). The effects of these variables should be similar in 
both the labor demand equat ions, whether compensation is measured in wages o r benefits. 
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As age (AGE) increases, the level of general human capital should increase through 
market work experience and other forms of informal education. The accumulation of general 
human capital increases at a diminishing rate over time. Increases in general human capital 
raise the value an hour of market work to the firm. Thus, the effects of AGE on 
compensation should be found to be an increasing concave quadratic function. Also, the 
supply of labor should be found to be a positive function of age. In the sample, the average 
age of males is 33 and the average age of females is 36. 
Education, measured as the highest grade attended (HGA) increases the value of an 
individual to the firm. Males and females in the sample have attended an average of 13. 9 
years of school. Educational attainment should be found to have a positive effect on both 
measures of labor demand. Rosen (1969) found that the fixed costs of employees are 
positively related to skill level as measured in part by educational attainment. 
In the labor supply decision, educational attainment can be considered a taste variable. 
Taste for education has been found in several studies to be an indicator of desire for leisure 
(Blank 1988). On the other hand, educational attainment may have a positive effect on hours 
of work by assuming that stronger tastes for work imply an increased incentive to acquire 
human capital . Thus, the expected effect of educational attainment on hours of work is 
ambiguous. 
Earlier empirical studies have found that racial status has an effect on compensation 
available. The sample of labor force participants consisted of 10.2 percent black males and 
15. 31 percent black females. Racial status, BLACK, is expected to have a negative effect on 
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available market compensation. The effects of racial status (BLACK) on the hours of work 
decision is unclear, but racial status is included because of its usefulness as a measure of 
cultural tastes. 
AJI data used to describe local economic conditions are state-level data. As previously 
stated, the use of state level data is mandated by the lack of consistent and complete data 
sources of smaller region units. State data should provide reasonable information on local 
labor markets and circumstances faced by individuals. Nonetheless, the actual economic 
conditions facing the individual may be inaccurately represented by state level data due to the 
size and heterogeneity of economic conditions within the state (Huffman and Tokle 1992). 
The empirical variables use to describe local labor market conditions include: a metropolitan 
area residence dummy (METRO) variable, the log of the average deflated cost per acre of 
land improved farm land (LNPLAND), the log of the state average non-supervisory 
manufacturing wage (LNSTEARN), and the average percentage of adjusted gross income 
paid in local , state and federal income tax (TAX). 
The average income tax paid as a percentage of adjusted gross income by males and 
females was 16. 79 percent and 16.81 percent respectively. For labor supply, increases in 
TAX correspond to decreases in wages. Therefore, tax effects on labor supply should be 
opposite in sign to wage effects on labor supply. The effect on labor supply of higher taxes is 
dependent on the nature the labor supply curve. In cases of a classically positively sloped 
labor supply curve, individuals should react to higher taxes by reducing the number of labor 
hours supplied. Higher income taxes reduce the relative compensation paid to forego leisure 
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time. Conversely, in cases of backward bending labor supply curves, an individual will react 
to higher taxes by increasing labor hours supplied. For the firm, a tax increase implies that 
wages must be paid at a higher rate to induce the same supply of labor. Since own employer 
provided health insurance benefits generally escape income tax, firms should be found to react 
to higher income tax rates by switching a portion of compensation from wages to health 
insurance benefits. 
During fiscal year 1986, a major income tax reform was enacted at the federal level. 
Joseph Pechman (1985) reasons that because of its effects on disposable income, taxation 
should be a factor in determining hours of labor supply. He finds that changes in hours 
worked due to income tax fluctuations are very small. Additionally, state income taxes are 
generally not reformed concurrently with federal taxes. Thus, the effects of the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 on labor supply should be insignificant. 
Seventy-five percent of males and seventy-percent of females in the sample resided in 
an incorporated metropolitan areas (METRO). Metropolitan residence status (METRO) is 
used as a measure of relative costs for an urban area verses those of a rural areas. Wages 
have been found to be positively related to population density (Ihlanfeldt 1989). METRO 
shoul.d also have a positive impact on the incidence of employer provided health benefits for 
two reasons. The first, as explained earlier, increased wage compensation also increases the 
tax burden of firms, therefore firms will be more likely to substitute health insurance benefits 
for wages. Secondly, METRO may also serve as a measure of the relative size of the firms. 
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Firm size has a positive impact on the percentage of compensation in the form of benefits 
(Brown and Medoff 1989). 
Living in METRO areas can have conflicting effects on the hours of work decision. 
Rural areas have fewer amenities available for workers including child care services which 
may have a negative impact on the labor supply with dependents. Time of commuting to and 
from work is a nonmeasured time consuming activity which increases with population density. 
This would serve as a tax on labor supply which is greater in METRO areas. Unmeasured 
sources of home goods may be more readily available to rural individuals. This would raise 
the reservation wage in rural areas, having a negative effect on hours of work. 
The measures oflocal cost of living are the log of the deflated average wage paid to 
nonsupervisory manufacturing personnel (LNSTEARN) and the average cost per acre of 
improved farmland (LNPLAND). LNSTEARN was used as a cost ofliving measure expected 
to be positively related to wage. LNPLAND was used in concert with METRO to aid in the 
identification of local amenity effects. The wage rate should have a positive relationship with 
each. 
In the incidence of indjvidual benefits equations, LNPLAND and LNSTEARN are 
replaced by the log of the deflated average daily charge per stay at a community hospital 
(LNDA YHOS). This is done because the cost of health insurance benefits is a single product 
category which can be more accurately measured by this more narrowly defined price 
category. 
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The log of the state average nonmanufacturing (LNSTEARN) wage is used as an 
indicator of local wage competition. The LNSTEARN should have a positive effect on the 
incidence of own employer provided health insurance for two reasons. First, firms will find it 
advantageous to increases the Jevel of benefits for the tax savings at the higher wage levels. 
Second, as labor competition in a state increases, firms use benefits to differentiate themselves 
from labor market competitors. 
The measures of household characteristics include the log of household asset income 
(LNASVAL), number persons in the household (HPERSONS) and of number of own children 
under six (HKIDSU6). Household asset income is defined as all household income from 
interest, dividends, and rental property deflated by the consumer price index (LNASINC). 
Because rental property income was negative for some families, $10,000 dollars was added to 
income from interest, dividends and rental property to ensure positive values ofLNASINC 
(Huffman and TokJe 93). 
Asset income represents the income available to an individual for purchasing market 
goods and services at zero hours of work. Asset income increases the attainable market 
goods prior the first hour of work. Leisure is assumed to be a normal good. Assuming 
diminishing marginal returns to market goods, the marginal utility obtainable from the first 
hour of market goods is reduced. The utility of leisure time remains fixed , thus becoming 
relatively more valuable than the market goods attainable though spending sacrificing the 
leisure time to engage in market work. Therefore, individual labor supply should decrease as 
asset income (LNASV AL) increases. 
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The variable household persons (HPERSONS) is defined as all individuals li ving 
within the household that are directly related to the household head. The average household 
sizes for the male and female sample were 1.64 and 1.87 respectively. As household size 
increases, the total cost of all goods and services purchased by the household increases. 
Additional household members increases the relative cost of leisure time to the household 
head by raising the household value of additional goods and services. The increased relative 
cost of leisure should increase the number oflabor hours supplied. 
The variable own children under six years of age (FKIDSU6) is used as a measure of 
the value of nonmarket time. Males in the sample has an average of 0.045 children under six 
years of age, while females had an average of0.091. Children under six years of age demand 
constant supervision and are generally not enrolled in school full time. A household head 
responsible for providing child care has two means by which to provide chi ld care. First, the 
househo ld head may supply the child care directly which would be reflected in a reduction of 
hours of market labor supplied. Secondly, the household head can purchase market child 
care. The cost associated with market child care should be positively correlated with labor 
supply. Several studies have found that women tend to provide their own child care and 
single men tend to increase hours of work to use market provided child care (Ribar 1992). 
Local labor market conditions are characterized by the following state empirical 
variables: the anticipated unemployment rate (PURA TE), unexpected business cycle shifts 
measured by the deviation (RU RATE) of actual from anticipated unemployment rate, 
anticipated job growth (PJOBGRO), and deviations from national employment trends 
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(RJOBGRO) (Huffman and Tokle 1993, Topel 1986). The predicted unemployment rate 
(PURATE) is obtained from a regression of a state's unemployment rate on a quadratic time 
trend over the years 1968-1990. It is a measure of long-term labor market conditions. The 
unanticipated unemployment shock (RURA TE) is defined as the difference between the actual 
state unemployment rate and the predicted state unemployment rate (PURA TE). It is a 
measure of short term shocks to labor demand. 
The predicted unemployment rate (PURA TE) is a measure of long-term economic 
conditions in an area. Is assumed to be an indicator of long-term aggregate labor supply 
relative to aggregate labor demand in an area. Competition for employment by potential 
workers will allow firms to fu lfill labor requirements at a lower marginal wage rate. 
Furthermore, lower monetary compensation costs and a reduced need to differentiate 
compensation due to a larger aggregate supply of potential workers, allows firms to reduce 
levels of health insurance benefits. 
The unanticipated portion of the unemployment rate (RURATE) measures short-term 
shocks in the unemployment rate. Assuming short-term labor displacement is less likely to 
cause worker migration than long-term displacement, the unanticipated unemployment rate is 
positively to related to firm labor market power. Short-term unemployment fluctuations can 
then be expected to be negatively related to the wage rate. In this model, short term 
fluctuations in the unemployment rate are assumed to be associated with marginal positions of 
employment, thus having less of a likelihood to affect the incidence of employer provided 
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health insurance benefits. Also, Nadiri and Rosen ( 1969) find that fixed costs are effected far 
less than variable costs by short-run cyclical fluctuations. 
Long-term employment growth (PJOBGRO) and relative job growth (RJOBGRO) are 
measures of local area economic expansion. Projected employment growth (PJOBGRO) is 
defined as the predicted value of the state's private employment level regressed on a quadratic 
time trend over the period 1968-1990. Relative job growth (RJOBGRO) is defined as the 
difference between the log of the predicted values of the national and state level employment 
growth rates regressed on a quadratic trend over the period 1968-1990. 
The level of predicted job growth (P JOBGRO) is used in as a measure of area labor 
market demand expansion. An increase in aggregate area labor demand puts upward pressure 
on the wage due to competition among firms for labor. This gives the firm an economic 
incentive to increase the compensation in the form of health insurance benefits. 
The measure of relative employment growth (RJOBGRO) shows the long-term 
growth rate of an area compared to the nation as a whole. As with predicted employment 
growth (PJOBGRO), there should be a positive relationship with the level of wages 
(LNW AGE). Theoretically this measure also can affect the incidence of own empl.oyer 
provided benefits equations, but early tests indicated that it did not significantly improve the 
model so it was dropped in order in improve the identification between the incidence of own 
employer provide health insurance and wage equations. 
The effects on participation rate of single males and single females are assumed to be 
similar unless stated. Bowen and Finegan (1965) found that even after correction for 
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socioeconomic facto rs the labor force participation rate of black women was higher than that 
of white females. 
Estimation Procedure 
Estimation of the labor demand and labor supply models takes place in two primary 
stages. All parameter estimation was performed using LIMDEP. First, the reduced form 
wage and own employer provided health insurance benefits equations are estimated over the 
sample of working individuals. Second, the two labor demand and the labor supply structural 
equations are estimated. 
The labor force participation equations are estimated for the entire sample of 
individuals. From the estimation results, the Inverse Mi ll 's Ratio (LAMBDA) is computed for 
each individual to be used as a sample correction term. The reduced fonn of the wage and 
incidence of employer provided health insurance are then estimated (See Appendix B for 
parameter estimation results) . The estimated reduced form parameters of the incidence of 
own employer provided benefits and wage equations are used to create predicted values of the 
log of the wage (PW AGE) and of the incidence of own employer provided health insurance 
benefits (PBENEFIT). It should be noted that due to the nature of the definition of the 
variables, reported positive incidence of own employer provided health insurance benefits 
implies only that the individual received these benefits from at least one employer during the 
year. Also, it should be noted that the predicted incidence of own employer provided health 
insurance benefits (PBENEFIT) is a continuous, variable over the zero-one range and the 
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actual incidence of own employer provided health insurance benefits is a zero-one dummy 
variable. 
In the final stage, the structural equations for wages, the incidence of own employer 
provided health insurance and the labor supply equations are estimated. The results from the 
parameter estimation are reported in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE. RESULTS 
This chapter reports the parameters obtained from tests of the empirical model and the 
conclusio ns of this study. The first through the fourth sections report the parameter 
estimation results of the participation equation, labor demand wage equations, labor demand 
own employer provided health insurance benefits equations, and labor supply equations 
respectively. The final section summarizes the conclusions which may be drawn from this 
study. The null hypothesis that all coefficients except the constant term are jointly zero is 
rejected for all specifications of both the labor supply and labor demand equations at the one 
percent significance level. 
Male and Female Participation Equations 
Probit estimation of the single male and single female participation in market-work 
equations are reported in Table 3.1. Participation in market work is modeled primarily to aid 
implementation of the Heckman ( 1980) process for correction of sample select ivity. Because 
of this goal, the model incorporates additional regressors in an effort to increase the 
identification of the model at the expense of the signifi cance of the individual parameters. 
However, the signs of a portion of the parameters are of interest and warrant discussion. 
Because the sample is restricted to single males and single females whose participation rates in 
market work are ninety-five and ninety-two percent respectively, the model has very little 
variation in behavior to explain. evertheless, the model yields reasonable results. 
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Table 3 .1. Participation in Market Work Equation: CPS-Single Males and Females 1984, 
1987, 1990. (t-ratios in parentheses) 
Probit Estimation: Dependent Variable=PEMPSTAT 
Variables Males Females 
Intercept 2.3780 4.899 
( 1.483) (3 .328) 
AGE 0.0753 0.0412 
(2.682) (1.719) 
AGE2 -0.0012 -0.0037 
(4.138) (3 .055) 
HGA 0.0024 0.1607 
(0.041) (2.884) 
HGA2 -0.0004 -0.0037 
(0. 199) (2.327) 
HGA*AGE 0.0014 0.0003 
( 1.574) (0.326) 
PB LACK -3 .554 0.2220 
(3 .708) (2.634) 
METRO 0.0125 -0.0942 
(0.152) (1 .374) 
LNSTEARN 1.0021 0.1677 
(2.256) (0.486) 
LNPLAND 0.0407 0.01 14 
(0.736) (0.235) 
TAX -0.0552 0.0 102 
( 1.742) (0.374) 
PURATE -0.0801 -0.0632 
(2.324) (2.204) 
RURATE -0.0579 -0.0222 
(2.065) (0.986) 
PJOBGRO -0.0359 -0.0194 
(0.717) (0.501) 
RJOBGRO -0.0010 -0.028 1 
(0.048) (1.75 1) 
LNASVAL -0.3257 -0.5608 
(2.570) (4.546) 
Table 3 . I. (continued) 
Variables 
HKIDSU6 
HPERSONS 
NEREGION 
WREGION 
SREGION 
Log-Likelihood 
No. obs 
Chi-Squared 
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Probit Estimation: Dependent Variable=PEMPST AT 
Males Females 
0.1453 -0.3597 
(1 .200) (5 .501) 
-0.1341 -0.1597 
(6.226) (7.701) 
0.0784 -0.0434 
(0.579) (0.372) 
0.1211 -0.0299 
(0.991) (0.286) 
0.3430 -0.025 1 
(2.549) (0.23 1) 
-813.405 -1162.13 
4726 5016 
140.17(20) 372.15(20) 
As expected, for both single males and single females, age (AGE) and educational 
attainment (HGA) are positive indicators of the probability oflabor force participation. Single 
black females are slightly more likely to have positive hours of work while the opposite is true 
for single black males. Single men in the sample living in an incorporated cities (METRO) are 
more likely to choose positive hours of market work than their nonmetropolitan counterparts, 
while the reverse is found to be true for females . Income taxes are found to have a positive 
effect on the probability of market work for women and a negative effect on the labor force 
participation of men. 
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Household characteristics are found to have a significant effect on the probability of 
labor force entry. Asset income (LNASV AL) and household size (HPERSONS) have 
negative effects on the participation rates of both single men and single women. The number 
of own children under the age of six (HKIDSU6) is found to have a positive effect on the 
probability of participation for single men and a negative effects on participation rates of 
single women. The estimates of the parameters associated with the household effects are 
consistent with numerous other labor supply studies using CPS data. 
Structural Labor Demand Wage Equations 
Ordinary least Squares (OLS) is used to obtain parameter estimates for four 
specifications of the structural labor demand wage equations for single males and single 
females. The sample is restricted to those with positive hours of market work. The 
specifications differ in the treatment of own employer provided health insurance as 
endogenous and exogenous to the wage equation. Each of these specifications is in turn 
estimated including and excluding the sample selectivity correction term (LAMBDA). 
Male 
The parameter estimates of the four structural male labor demand wage equation 
specifications are reported in Table 3 .2. The signs of the estimated parameters are similar 
across all specifications. Sample selectivity bias is not found to be a significant factor in the 
male wage equations. 
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Table 3.2. Structural Labor Demand Equation-Market Wage: CPS-Single Males l 984, 1987, 
1990. (t-ratios in parentheses) 
OLS Estimation: Dependent Variable = LNW AGE 
Endogenous Benefits Exogenous Benefits 
Variables Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected 
Intercept -1.7659 - 1.8094 -0.9483 -1 .0622 
(5.160) (5.57 1) (7.123) (5 .710) 
AGE 0.0878 0.0914 0.0675 0.0657 
(9.106) (9.625) (10.526) (11.130) 
AGE2 -0 .0009 -0.0009 -0.0006 -0.0007 
(8.141) (8.499) (8 .948) (8.73 1) 
HGA 0.0781 0.0789 0.0545 0.0565 
(10.614) (11.3 73) (27.446) (21 .6 10) 
L STEARN 0.4006 0.4074 0.2907 0.3072 
(4.909) (5.049) (3 .913) (4.260) 
METRO 0.1078 0.1081 0.0851 0.0863 
(5 .9 14) (5.979) (10.907) (5 .210) 
TAX 0.0079 0.0062 0.0030 0.0005 
(1 .266) (0.958) (2.872) (0.080) 
PURATE -0.0140 -0.0118 -0.0073 -0.0 100 
(1.445) (l.602) (1.851) (1.414) 
RURATE 0.0061 0.0041 -0.0014 -0.0038 
(0.954) (0.620) (5 . 169) (0.668) 
PJOBGRO -0.0217 -0.0213 0.0003 0.0002 
(2. 104) (2.118) (0.760) (0.020) 
RJOBGRO 0.0132 0.0130 0.0064 0.0063 
(3 .015) (3 .018) (2.466) ( 1. 780) 
BLACK -0.1666 -0. 1742 -0.1272 -0. 1408 
(6.322) (6.456) (4.933) (5 .78 1) 
LNPLAND 0.0148 0.0155 0.0191 0.0199 
( 1.308) ( 1.364) (1.612) (1.832) 
BENEFIT 0.2821 0.2825 
( 18.891) ( 18.336) 
PBENEFIT -0.18151 -0.1758 
(2.221) (2.282) 
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Table 3.2. (continued) 
OLS Estimation: Dependent Variable = LNW AGE 
Endogenous Benefits Exogenous Benefits 
Variables Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected 
LAMBDA 0.2737 0.2300 
(1.817) (l .628) 
Ri 0.2503 0.2506 0.3016 0 .3020 
No. obs 4508 4508 4508 4508 
F 115.39 107.32 149.25 138.83 
The estimated parameters on of the incidence of own employer provided health insurance on 
wages are predicated on the treatment of this variable as endogenous or exogenous 
(BENEFIT, PBENEFIT). Actual incidence of own employer provided health insurance 
(BENEFIT) had a positive and significant effect on the wage rate for both the selectivity 
corrected and uncorrected specifications. The predicted probability of own employer 
provided health insurance (PBENEFIT) had a negative and significant effect on the wage rate. 
As previously explained, it has been shown theoretically and empirically in other studies that a 
tradeoff exists between wages and employer provided health benefits, which suggests that 
own employer provided health benefits and wages are simultaneously determined. If, in fact, 
they are simultaneously determined, the variations of the model which use BENEFIT as a 
regressor are measuring only the direct correlation between wages and benefits, not the 
compensating differential from the interaction between them. The simultaneity implies that 
the proper specifications would use the exogenously predicted value, PBENEFIT. 
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Age and educational attainment are found to have a positive and significant impact on 
the market wage of single males. The age effect diminishes as age increases, consistent with 
commonly observed hump-shaped lifetime earnings profiles. Black males in the sample are 
found to have lower average wage rates then the males in the sample as a whole. 
The measures oflocal cost ofliving and quality oflife, LNPLAND LNSTEARN, 
METRO, TAX, are all found to have a positive impact on market wages. AJI are found to be 
significant factors in wage determination except TAX. 
The long term local economic measures had mixed results, and several were sensitive 
to changes in specification of the wage equation. The variables that yielded consistent results 
were the predicted unemployment rate and relative job growth. In each of the four 
specifications, the parameter of the predicted unemployment rate (PURA TE) is negative and 
insignificant. In all fou r specifications of the structural male wage demand function , the 
relative growth in employment (RJOBGRO) had a positive and significant effect on the level 
of wages. The other variables were less robust. 
Tn the equations that treat own employer provided benefits as endogenously 
determined with wages, the parameter of the predicted job growth rate (PJOBGRO) is 
negative and significant whether or not the selectivity correction is employed. Conversely, the 
parameter of the variable PJOBGRO is found to be positive but insignificant in both 
specifications treating the incidence of own employer provided insurance as exogenously 
determined. Specifications of the model that treat own employer provided health insurance as 
endogenous estimate the parameter of the unemployment shock (RURATE) to be positive and 
68 
significant and those treating own employer provided heaJth insurance as exogenous estimate 
unemployment shock as negative and marginally significant. 
Female 
The parameter estimates for all four specifications of the wage equation showed the 
expected effects of the included variables on the market wage of femaJes. The insignificant 
parameters on the lambda term in columns two and four of Table 3 .3 indicate that there is no 
significant bias in the wage equation caused by self-selection of women into the labor force. 
The results of the effects of the incidence of benefits on the female wage rate are 
simi lar across the four estimated specifications. The sign of the estimated parameter on 
predicted incidence of benefits is negative when the selectivity correction is excluded and 
positive when it is included. In neither case is the parameter for predicted incidence of 
benefits found to be significant. ln both the corrected and uncorrected specifications of the 
female wage equation, the parameters for the actuaJ incidence of own employer provided 
health insurance (BENEFIT) are found to be positive and significant. 
Age and educational attainment of women are found to have a positive and significant 
effect on the market wage. The classic life-cycle pattern of concave age-wage profi les is 
obtained. Black women are found to command a lower wage than other woman. 
The parameters used to identify local cost of living and quality oflife includ ing 
LNSTEARN, TAX, LNPLAND and METRO have positive effects on the wage rate. The 
estimates of these parameters are aJI significant except LNPLAND in each of the four 
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Table 3.3. Structural Labor Demand Equation-Market Wage: CPS-Single Females 1984, 
1987, 1990. (t-ratios in parentheses) 
OLS Estimation: Dependent Variable = LNW AGE 
Endogenous Benefits Exogenous Benefits 
Variables Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected 
Intercept -l.0817 -0.9572 -1.0575 -1.0963 
(6.501) (5.956) (7.123) (7.093) 
AGE 0.0502 0.0462 0.045 1 0.0460 
(10.251) ( 10 076 (10.526) (10.463) 
AGE2 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 
(8.993) (8.290) (8.948) (8.873) 
HGA 0.0836 0.0702 0.0656 0.067 1 
(11.008) (9.781) (27.446) (23 482) 
LNSTEARN 0.1476 0.0948 0.2442 0 2479 
(1 .936) (2.323) (3 .913) (3 .964) 
METRO 0.1837 0.1662 0.1593 0. 1585 
(10.141) (7.646) (10.907) (I 0.830) 
TAX 0.0153 0.0 152 0.0 154 0.0 152 
(2.742) (2.693) (2.872) (2.820) 
PURATE -0.0086 -0 0098 -0.0108 -0.0 11 9 
(1.4 14) (1.3 17) (1.851) (I. 998) 
RURATE -0.0247 -0.0235 -0.0248 -0.0254 
(4.930) (4.606) (5 .169) (5.245) 
PJOBGRO 0.0014 0.0042 0.0048 0.0043 
(0.207) (0 630) (0.760) (0 679) 
RJOBGRO -0.0077 -0.0078 -0.0084 -0.0089 
(2.158) (2.037) (2.466) (2.583) 
BLACK -0.1069 -0.0920 -0.0853 -0.0830 
(3 .354) (3 .644) (4.933) (4.749) 
LNPLAND 0.0276 0.0188 0.0158 0.0161 
(2.453) ( 1.578) (l.612) ( 1.637) 
BENEFIT 0.2644 0.2657 
(18.891) ( 18.885) 
PBE EFIT -0.10181 0 0324 
(1.353) (0.314) 
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Table 3.3. (continued) 
OLS Estimation: Dependent Variable = L WAGE 
Endogenous Benefits Exogenous Benefits 
Variables Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected 
LAMBDA -0.0717 0.0660 
(0.942) (0.901) 
Ri 0.2432 0.2431 0.2972 0.2973 
No. obs 4635 4635 4635 4635 
F 114.25 106.00 150.33 139 64 
estimated specifications. 
Of the two variables used to describe long-term economic trends, the effect on the 
wage rate of the predicted unemployment rate (PURA TE) is positive and significant in only 
one of the estimated specifications. The coefficient of predicted job growth (PJOBGRO) is 
negative and significant in all four specifications. 
Exogeneity Test 
A test was performed on structural wage specifications to test for exogeneity of the 
incidence of employer provided health benefits. The test is based on a procedure developed 
by Hausman ( 1978). Both the actual incidence and predicted probability from the reduced 
form benefits equation estimation of employer provided health insurance are included as 
regressors in the wage equation. Including the actual incidence of employer provided health 
insurance in the structural equations separates the exogenous influence from the 
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simultaneously determined influence. The reported test statistic is the t-statistic on the . 
parameter 'V, from an equation of the form y =a+ px + \VX +oz, where Z is a vector of 
" exogenous variables and X is the predicted value from the reduced for equation (Greene 
1990). If the incidence of employer provided health insurance is simultaneously determjned 
with wage, the estimated parameter on the predicted incidence of benefits should be found to 
be significant. 
The results of the exogeneity tests are reported in Table 3.4. The predicted incidence 
of employer provided health insurance is found to be endogenous to both the sample 
selectivity corrected and uncorrected single male wage equations. The sample selectivity 
uncorrected specification of the female wage equation was also found to be simultaneously 
determined with wages. Conversely, the sample selectivity uncorrected specification of the 
female wage equation shows no endogenity with the own employer provided benefits 
equation. Because sample selection was not found to occur in the female wage equation, the 
null assumption of exogenously determined wage and benefits equations can be rejected in 
favor of simultaneously determined wages and benefits. 
The results of the exogeneity test described above for single females show the 
incidence of own employer provided health insurance benefits to be simultaneously determined 
with wages. As with males, the selectivity uncorrected specification which treats the 
incidence of own employer provided health insurance benefits as endogenous seems to be 
most appropriate. 
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Table 3.4. t-statistic results of Exogeneity of Variables Tests 
Wage Equation 
Male Female 
VARIABLE Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected 
BENEFIT -2.00 -3 .64 -3.23 -0.18 
PBENEFIT 18.65 18.84 19.07 18 .88 
Incidence of Own Employer Provided Health Insurance Equation 
LNWAGE 
PLNWAGE 
BE EFlT 
PBENEFIT 
Elasticities 
Male Female 
Uncorrected 
-2.00 
17.64 
Uncorrected 
19.87 
0.34 
Corrected 
-0.41 
17.67 
Uncorrected 
-l .83 
17.83 
Labor Supply Equation 
Corrected 
19 9 1 
0.73 
Female 
Uncorrected 
22.06 
-1 .72 
Corrected 
-2. 11 
18.98 
Corrected 
21 .98 
-0.95 
The elasti.cities for selected factors in the wage equation for males and females are 
reported in Table 3.5. An increase in the predicted incidence of employer provided health 
insurance of ten percent is found to have an inelastic negative effect of one percent on male 
wages and an inelastic positive effect of less than one percent on female wages. The effects of 
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Table 3.5. Select Factor Elasticity's of the Labor Demand Wage Equations 
E ndogenous Benefits Exogenous Benefits 
Variables Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected 
MALES 
LNSTEARN 0.40 0.4 1 0.29 0.31 
TAX 0. 13 0.11 0.05 0.01 
LNPLAND 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 
BENEFIT 0.33 0.28 
PBENEFIT -0.10 -0.12 
Women 
LNSTEARN 0. 15 0. 10 0.24 0.25 
TAX 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 
LNPLAND 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 
BENEFIT 0.30 0.30 
PBENEFIT 0.065 0.028 
taxes, land prices and average state manufacturing wages were found to be positive, but 
inelastic, for males and females . Male wages were most responsive to average manufacturing 
wages, where as woman's wages were most responsive to state tax levels. 
Structural Labor Demand Benefit Equations 
The male and female structural own employer provided health insurance benefits 
equations were estimated using a probit specification. The estimated coefficients for single 
males and single females are reported in Table 3.6. Four different specifications are reported 
differing on the inclusion or exclusion of the sample selectivity correction term (LAMBDA) 
and on the exogeneity or endogeneity of the wage. 
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Table 3.6. Structural Labor Demand Equation-Incidence of Own Employer Sponsored 
Benefits: CPS-Single Males and Females 1984, 1987, 1990. (t-ratios in 
parentheses) 
Probit Estimation: Dependent Variable=BENEFIT 
Male Female 
Variables Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected 
Intercept -2.0203 -1.8729 -1.5291 0.1248 
(2. 128) (1.864) (1.485) (0.124) 
AGE 0.0725 0.0679 0.0501 0.0124 
(2.037) (1.782) ( 1.901) (0.488) 
AGE2 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0004 0.0003 
(2. 156) (1.783) ( J .53 1) (0.118) 
HGA 0.06 18 0.0632 0.1305 0.0736 
(2.052) (2.045) (3 .736) (2.189) 
TAX 0.0342 0.0395 0.0146 0.0150 
(2.059) (2.238) (0 927) (0.942) 
PURATE -0.0012 0.0484 -0.0093 0.0199 
(0.074) (0.292) (0.575) (1.212) 
PJOBGRO -0.0593 -0.0590 0.0078 0.0351 
(2.552) (2.520) (0.366) (1.628) 
LNDAYHOS -0 1670 -0.1700 -0.052 1 -0.1927 
(1.488) (1.492) (0.405) ( 1.525) 
METRO 0.0810 0.0839 0.2113 0.1821 
(1.325) ( 1.369) (2.455) (2.128) 
BLACK -0. 1047 -0.0887 -0.1408 -0.1589 
(J. 138) (0.905) (2.04 1) (2.272) 
PWAGE 0.3728 0.2896 -0.4640 -0.1172 
(0.807) (0.627) (1.010) (0.260) 
LAMBDA -0.4010 -1.4205 
(I .034) (6.001) 
Log-Likelihood -2597.696 -2597.268 -2612.939 -2594.305 
No. obs 4508 4508 4635 4635 
Chi-Squared 304.68( 10) 305.54(11) 213.99(18) 227.23(11 
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Male 
Sample selectivity bias is not found to be significant in the male health insurance 
benefits equation. [n the male structural Benefits function, the predicted wage (PW AGE) rate 
is fou nd to have a positive, but insignificant effect on the incidence of own employer provided 
health insurance benefits . Although neither the parameters of predicted wage in the selectivity 
corrected or uncorrected specifications are significant, the positive value of the predicted 
wage parameters may suggest that the effect of increasing incentives for employers to sponsor 
health insurance plans as wages rise is stronger than the tradeoff effect of wages for benefits. 
The strong positive effect of actual incidence of employer provided health benefits 
(BENEFIT) lends addi tional evidence to the hypothesis of a strong correlation between high 
wages and the incidence of benefits. Consistent with the presumption that employers switch 
to benefits in part as a response to the relative cost of providing compensation in benefit form 
rather than wage form, the effect of the average cost per day of a stay in a community hospital 
has a negative but insignificant effect on the incidence of receiving own employer provided 
health insurance. Further, individual average income tax rates (TAX) had a positive effect on 
the probability of receiving employer provided health benefits. 
AGE and educational. attainment (HGA) were found to have a positive impact on the 
probability of receiving own employer provided health insurance benefits. The effects mimic 
those in the wage equation. The sign associated with the estimated parameter for predicted 
long term unemployment rate (PURATE) was negative in the uncorrected specification and 
reversed when corrected for sample selectivity. The estimated parameter is not significant in 
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either case. Increases in the predicted job growth rate (P JOBGRO) have a negative impact on 
the incidence of receiving own employer provided health insurance benefits. 
Female 
Single females were found to sample select into positions w1th employer provided 
health benefits. The signs of the estimated coefficients are similar across both specifications, 
except in the cases of AGE2 and PURATE Neither of the inconsistent coefficients are found 
to be significant at the ten percent level. 
The predicted wage rate (PW AGE) is found to have a negative effect on the incidence 
of own employer provided health insurance benefits. This finding suggests a sacrifice of 
wages for health insurance benefits as the theory of compensating differentials would suggest. 
However, this relationship is not found to be significant in either specification. This may be a 
result from an identification problem caused by similarities between the wage and incidence of 
own employer provided health benefits equations. 
The estimated coefficients for the variables used to describe personal characteristics 
AGE and educational attainment (HGA) are found to have a positive effects on the incidence 
of own employer provide health benefits. Black ethnic status has a negative effect on the 
incidence of health insurance benefits. Those residing in metropolitan areas have an increased 
incidence of employer sponsored health benefits over rural dwellers. 
As with males, personal income taxes are found to have a positive effect and the cost 
of medical care is found to a negative effect on the predicted incidence of own employer 
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provided health insurance. This is as predicted, if higher taxes and lower benefit costs induce 
firms to alter their compensation packages toward less expensive forms of remuneration. 
The effects of the predicted unemployment rate (PURA TE) is conditioned on the 
inclusion or exclusion of the sample selectivity correction term. Since significant sample 
selectivity bias exists, the predicted unemployment rate is found to have a positive impact on 
the incidence of employer provided health insurance. Predicted job growth (PJOBGRO) is 
also found to have a positive impact on the probability of receiving health insurance benefits. 
Exogeneity Test 
A test of the exogeneity of wages was performed on the structural benefits equations 
similar to that performed on the wage equations. The results of the test are reported in Table 
3 .4 The incidence of employer provided health insurance benefits is found to be 
simultaneously determined with wages for both single males and single females . 
Elasticities 
Elasticity estimates of the effects of selected factors on the incidence of employer 
provided benefits are reported in Table 3.7. The wage elasticity is found to be 0.533 fo r males 
and negative 0 . 16 1 for females . The elasticity associated with the cost of medical care 
(LNDA YHOS) is found to be negative and similar for males (0 .239) and females (0.264). 
The elasticity effects of income taxes (TAX) are found to be much greater for males (0.826) 
than for females (0.339). 
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Table 3.7 . Select Factor E lasticities for the Labor Demand Own Employer Provided 
Health Insurance Benefits Equations. 
Variables 
MALES 
PW AGE 
LNDAYHOS 
TAX 
Women 
PWAGE 
LNDAYHOS 
TAX 
Uncorrected 
0.53 
-0.24 
0.83 
-0.64 
-0.07 
0.33 
Structural Labor Supply Hours Equations 
Corrected 
0.4 1 
-0.24 
0.95 
-0.16 
-0.26 
0.34 
Four specifications of the labor supply equations for single males and single females 
with positive hours of work over the past year were estimated using instrumental variable 
estimation. As with the wage equations, both selectivity corrected and uncorrected versions 
of the model were estimated. In addition, versions that treat own employer provided health 
insurance benefits as exogenous and endogenous to labor supply are reported. 
Male 
The parameter estimates of the single male labor supply equation specifications are 
presented in Table 3 .8. The sample consists of 4508 individuals. Except for the parameters 
associated with the two measures of own employer provided health insurance benefits, 
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Table 3.8. Structural Labor Supply Equation: CPS-Single Males 1984, 1987, J 990. (t-ratios 
in parentheses) 
OLS Estimation: Dependent Variable=LNHOURS 
Variables Benefits Endogenous Benefits Exogenous 
Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected 
Intercept 7.1132 7.0967 7.3322 7.2496 
( 19.570) (19.897) (23.849) (22. 758) 
AGE 0.0473 0.0394 0.0391 0.029 1 
(3 .983) (3 .065) (3 .643) (2.550) 
AGE2 -0.0052 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0003 
(4.035) (2.937) (3 .681) (2.342) 
HGA 0.0205 0.0 160 0.0127 0.0079 
(2.046) ( l.550) (1.424) (0.868) 
LNPLAND 0.0205 0.0183 0.0243 0.0211 
( 1.763) (1.569) (2.190) (1.891) 
METRO 0.0334 0.0294 0.0295 0.0264 
(1.514) (1.323) ( 1.383) (1 .228) 
TAX 0.0087 0.0092 0.0036 0.0049 
(1.484) (1.539) (0.686) (0.933) 
LNASVAL -0.0958 -0.0767 -0.0978 -0.0649 
(3 .216) (2.334) (3.425) (2.042) 
FKIDSU6 0.0325 0.02 16 0.03 14 0.0123 
(1. 137) (0.728) (1.146) (0.433) 
PB LACK -0.1074 -0.0819 -0.0954 -0.0595 
(3 .283) (2.259) (3 .068) (1.77 1) 
FPERSONS -0.0275 -0.0184 -0.02 16 -0.0054 
(4.489) (1.937) (3 .666) (0.620) 
PW AGE -0.0787 -0.0432 -0. 1410 -0.1180 
(0.517) (0.285) (0.902) (0.750) 
BENEFIT 0.3487 0.3437 
(7.395) (7.219) 
PBENEFIT -0.0225 -0.02 19 
(0.434) (0.415) 
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Table 3.8. (continued) 
OLS Estimation: Dependent Yariable=LNHOURS 
Variables Benefits Endogenous Benefits Exogenous 
LAMBDA 
R1 
No. obs 
F 
Uncorrected Corrected 
0.0477 
4508 
18.77 
-0.2972 
(1.265) 
0.048 1 
4508 
17.49 
Uncorrected 
0. 1245 
4508 
53.27 
Corrected 
-0.5237 
(2.487) 
0.1256 
4508 
49.64 
BENEFIT and PBENEFIT, the signs of the parameter estimates are consistent across all 
model specifications. Evidence of sample selectivity by males is found only in the 
specification which treats own employer provide health insurance benefits as exogenous to the 
hours of work decision. 
Single males are found to decrease hours of work supplied as their predicted wage 
(PW AGE) increases. Consistent with numerous labor supply studies, this suggests that there 
a backward bending labor supply curve for single males. The level of asset income 
(LNASV AL) had a negative effect on the number of hours worked as required by the 
assumption that leisure is a normal good. Own employer provided health insurance is found 
to have differing impacts on single male labor supply dependent on its treatment as an 
endogenously or exogenously determined factor. When treated as simultaneously determined 
with hours of work, increasing the predicted incidence of receiving own employer provided 
insurance benefits (PBENEFIT) decreases the number of hours of labor supplied 
Conversely, when the incidence of benefits is treated as exogenous to the hours of work 
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decision, it is found to have a positive effect on hours of labor supplied. The human capital 
measures AGE and educational attainment (HGA) are found to positively and significantly 
influence the labor hours supplied. The amenity and cost ofliving variables, LNPLAND, 
METRO, and TAX, all had a positive impact on the hours of work decision. The size of the 
household is found to negatively influence the hours of labor supplied. The presence of 
children under six years of age was found to positively influence hours of work. 
Female 
The parameter estimates of the four specifications of the single female labor supply 
equation. The model was estimated over a sample of 4635 individuals with positive hours in 
the past year. The results are displayed in Table 3.9. The signs of the parameters are 
consistent across specifications. Significant sample selectivity is present in both specifications, 
whether treating own employer provided health insurance as exogenous and endogenous. 
Consistent with an upward sloping labor supply function, the predicted wage (PW AGE) had a 
positive effect on the number of labor hours supplied (LNHOURS) by single females . In 
addition, household asset income (LNASV AL) has a negative effect on labor supply, 
consistent with the assumption that leisure is a normal good. 
The effects of own employer provided health insurance on single female labor supply 
are consistently positive across specifications. However, the two specifications treating the 
incidence of benefits as exogenous are significant to higher degree that those which treat them 
as endogenous to the hours decision. 
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Table 3.9. Structural Labor Supply Equation: CPS-Single Females 1984, 1987, 1990. 
(t-ratios in parentheses) 
OLS Estimation: Dependent Variable=LNHOURS 
Variables Benefits Endogenous Benefits Exogenous 
Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected 
Intercept 8.3672 8.0586 8.0310 7.9011 
(24.334) (23 .822) (26.072) (25 .096) 
AGE 0.0132 0.0145 0.0127 0.0096 
(1.522) (1.682) (1.777) (1 .295) 
AGE2 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.000 I 
(1 .863) (1.798) (1.997) (1 .329) 
HGA -0.0075 -0.0013 -0.0050 -0.0091 
(0.554) (0.094) (0.633) (1. 106) 
LNPLAND -0.0129 -0.0076 -0.0101 -0.0102 
(0.993) (0.566) (0.938) (0.947) 
METRO -0.0298 -0.0113 -0.0281 -0.0237 
(0.952) (0.328) (1.124) (0.941) 
TAX -0.0042 -0.0046 -0.0059 -0.0062 
(0.730) (0. 796) (1 .076) (1. 124) 
LNASVAL -0.1175 -0.0922 -0.1074 -0.0811 
(3 .513) (2.495) (3.424) (2.337) 
FKIDSU6 -0.0656 -0.033 1 -0.0678 -0.0406 
(2.683) (1 .140) (2.871) (l .483) 
PB LACK 0.0187 -0.0037 0.0113 -0.0004 
(0.701) (0.125) (0.505) (0.019) 
FPERSONS -0.0389 -0.0264 -0.0246 -0.0145 
(5.967) (2.976) (3 .950) (I. 727) 
PW AGE 0. 13898 0.0147 0.1718 0.1753 
(1.084) (0.767) ( 1.503) ( 1.529) 
BENEFIT 0.3021 0.3010 
(8.977) (8 .958) 
PBENEFIT 0.1398 0.0735 
(1.899) (0.917) 
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Table 3.9. (continued) 
OLS Estimation: Dependent Variable=LNHOURS 
Variables Benefits Endogenous Benefits Exogenous 
Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected 
LAMBDA -0.3005 -0.2392 
(2.122) (1.8 17) 
Ri 0.0347 0.0336 0.1248 0.1254 
o. obs 4635 4635 4635 4635 
F 13 .33 12.37 54.96 50.99 
The measures of human capital had similar signs across all specifications. AGE is 
found to have a positive effect and educationaJ attainment (HGA) a negative effect on the 
hours oflabor supplied (LNHOURS). The measures of local costs and amenities including 
METRO, TAX, and LNPLAND all show negative effects on hours of market work supplied. 
Single fema les are found to decrease labor supply as the number persons in the 
household increases (HPERSONS). Moreover, an additional reduction in labor hours 
supplied is found as the number of the own household members under the age of six years 
(HKJDSU6) increases. The effects of PBLACK were found to be insignificant across all 
specifications. 
Exogeneity Test 
The results of a test of exogeneity of own employer-provided health insurance benefits 
to the labor supply decision are reported in Table 3.4 The incidence of employer 
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Table 3.10. Select Factor Elasticity's for the Labor Supply Equations. 
Endogenous Benefits Exogenous Benefits 
Variables Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected 
MALES 
PWAGE -0.08 0.04 -0.14 -0.12 
BENEFITS 0.42 0.41 
PBENEFITS 0.0 16 0.015 
TAX 0.15 0.16 0.06 0.08 
LNASVAL -0. 10 -0.08 -0.10 -0.07 
Women 
PW AGE 0.14 0.02 0.17 0.18 
BENEFIT 0.35 0.35 
PBENEFIT -0.07 0.05 
TAX -0.07 -0.08 -0. l -0. 1 
LNASVAL -0.] 18 -0.092 -0.11 -0.08 
provided health insurance benefits is found to be exogenous to the labor supply decision for 
single males and single females. This suggests that the incidence of employer-provided health 
Lnsurance benefits is largely determined by the individual employer as opposed to worker 
characteri st ics. 
Elasticities 
Elasticity estimates of the effects of selected factors on the labor supply are reported in 
Table 3 .10. Labor supply is found to be inelastic and negative for males (-0.141) and inelasti.c 
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and positive (0.172) for females. Labor supply elasticity in response to the incidence of own 
employer benefits is positive and inelastic for males (0.417) and females (0.353). This 
suggests as expected for males and females the labor supply is increased by the existence of 
employer-provided health insurance benefits. 
Conclusions 
This study gave some insights into the theory and empirical findings associated with 
the effects of the incidence of health insurance benefits on labor supply. The finding of 
primary importance from this study is that single individuals do in fact increase labor supply in 
response to the incidence of employer-provided group health benefits. Further, it has been 
found that the incidence of employer-provided group health insurance is exogenous to the 
labor supply decision suggesting that the eligibility for inclusion into an own employer group 
health insurance benefits is predicated on the individual employer rather than personal 
characteristics. 
Evidence is also found to support the hypothesis that wages and the incidence of 
health insurance benefits are simultaneously determined. As with other studies, males were 
found to have backward bending labor supply curves, while female were found to have 
upward sloping labor supply curves. 
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APPENDIX A. REDUCED FORM EQUATIONS 
Reduced Form Wage Equation 
Reduced Form Incidence of Employer Provided Health Insurance Equation 
Bj = Ga[Xj(Kj;1 + (;j;K{;1) + L(Kj;2 + (;j;Kj;2) + P(Kj;3 + (;j; K{~3) + Kj;sM + (;j;RI<{~4 
+(;j; a.j; Bj + (;j; Bjw I) + (;j; µj\: + Bj; :A) + (;j; µj; 
Reduced Form Hours Equation 
lnHj = Xj(K{; + (;j~Kj; 1 + a.{;Kj;1) + L(K{;2 + (;{;Kj;2 + a.{;Kj;2) + (;{;RK{~4 +a.{~Kj;sM 
+SKj1;6 + (Bk + Bjw +Bk))) + d~ µj; + a.j~ µj; + µi~ 
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APPENDIX B. REDUCED FORM REGRESSION RES UL TS 
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Table B.1. Reduced Form Labor Demand Equation-Market Wage: CPS-Single Males 
1984, 1987, 1990. (t-ratios in parentheses) 
OLS Estimation: Dependent Varaiable=LNW AGE 
Endogenous Benefits Exogenous Benefits 
Variables Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected 
Intercept -1.2893 -1.4 145 -0.29950 -0.4387 
(3 .568) (3 .750) (1 .234) (1.699) 
AGE 0.0620 0.065 1 0.0501 0.0541 
(9.601) (9 326) (8.00 I) (8.012) 
AGE2 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0006 
(9.838) (8.925) (8.526) (8.054) 
HGA -0.0199 0 02 16 -0.0034 -0.0013 
(1 .385) ( 1.491) (0.245) (0.099) 
HGA2 0.0012 0.00 1 l 0.0015 0.0014 
(2.715) (2.486) (3 .695) (3 .389) 
ED* AGE 0.0004 0.0002 0.0005 0.0006 
(1.701) (I.913) (2.491) (2.778) 
LNSTEARN 0.2524 0.0944 0.2396 0.2747 
(2. 756) (2.955) (2.713) (3 .0 17) 
METRO 0.0717 0.0722 0.0802 0.0816 
(3 .867) (3 .896) (4.822) ( 4 897) 
TAX 0.0003 -0.0016 0.0024 0.00009 
(0.043) (0.231) (0.387) (0.0 14) 
PURATE -0.0093 -0.0122 -0.0067 -0.0103 
(1 .258) ( 1.560) (0.943) (1.387) 
R URATE 0.0098 0.008 1 -0.00 11 -0.0037 
(1.465) (1.171) (0.200) (0.640) 
IUOBGRO -0.0159 -0.0 171 -0.0095 -0.0109 
(1.517) (1.621) (0.952) ( 1.086) 
RSHOCK 0.0107 0.0106 0.0076 0.0075 
(2.602) (2.592) (1.941) ( 1.9 11) 
LNDAYHOS 0.1428 0.1464 
(2.82 1) (2.886) 
BLACK -0.1283 -0. 1402 -0.11 53 -0 1310 
(5.362) (5 .383) (4 .996) (5 .212) 
LNPLAND 0.0 142 0.0150 0.0235 0.0247 
(1.168) (1.23 l ) (2.030) (2. 132) 
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Table B. l . (continued) 
OLS Estimation: Dependent Variable=LNW AGE 
Endogenous Benefits Exogenous Benefits 
Variables Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected 
NEREGION 0.0098 0.0116 0.0052 0.0074 
(0.345) (0.408) (0.190) (0.270) 
LNPLAND 0.0142 0.0150 0.0235 0.0247 
(1.168) (1.231) (2.030) (2.132) 
NEREGION 0.0098 0.0116 0.0052 0.0074 
(0.345) (0.408) (0.190) (0.270) 
SREGION -0.0192 -0.0101 0.0017 0.0136 
(0. 716) (0.363) (0.065) (0.505) 
WREGION -0.0174 -0.0150 0.0380 0.0424 
(0.607) (0.521) (1.536) (1. 704) 
BENEFIT 0.2864 0.2871 
(18.565) (18 .607) 
LAMBDA 0.1851 0.2425 
(1.157) (1 .574) 
Ri 0.2530 0.2532 0.3050 0.3054 
No. obs 4508 4508 4508 4508 
F 84.47 80.10 10.95 10.38 
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Table B.2. Reduced Form Labor Demand Equation-Market Wage: CPS-Single Females 
1984, 1987, 1990. (t-ratios in parentheses) 
OLS Estimation: Dependent Variable=LNW AGE 
Endogenous Benefits Exogenous Benefits 
Variables Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected 
Intercept -0.8966 -0.6687 -0.17852 -0.0908 
(2.920) (2.068) (0.0758) (0.365) 
AGE 0.0351 0.0323 0.03 18 0.0306 
(5.915) (5 .333) (5.555) (5.243) 
AGE2 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 
(7.920) (6.888) (7.959) (7.306) 
HGA -0.0029 -0.0238 -0.0276 -0.035 
(0.171) (1.] 05) (1 .644) (1.937) 
HGA2 0.002 0.0025 0.0025 0.0027 
(4.137) (4.765) (5.252) (5.273) 
ED* AGE 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 
(2.701) (2.696) (3 .222) (3 .216) 
LNSTEARN 0.141 5 0.1392 0.2761 0.2736 
(1 .763) (1.735) (3 . 714) (3 .678) 
METRO 0.1533 0.1559 0. I 591 0.1600 
(9.684) (9.832) (10.908) (10.953) 
TAX 0.0094 0.0097 0.0102 0.0103 
(1.551) (l.607) (1. 74 7) (1 .770) 
PURATE -0.0087 -0.0055 -0.0104 -0.0091 
(1.400) (0.873) (1. 742) (1.482) 
RURATE -0.0107 -0.0093 -0.0247 -0.0238 
(1.752) (1.506) (5.136) (4.898) 
PJOBGRO 0.0005 0.0016 0.0051 0.0055 
(0.064) (0.190) (0.636) (0.681) 
RJOBGRO -0.0077 -0.0063 -0.0103 -0.0097 
(2.030) ( l.641) (2.868) (2.653) 
LNDAYHOS 0. 1567 0.1512 
(3 .709) (3 .575) 
BLACK -0.0841 -0.0902 -0 .0764 -0.0791 
(4.644) (4.935) (4.380) (4.488) 
LNPLAND 0.0099 0.0095 0.0138 0.0135 
(0.915) (0.872) (1.33 ]) (1.302) 
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Table B.2. (continued) 
OLS Estimation: Dependent Yariable=LNW AGE 
Endogenous Benefits Exogenous Benefits 
Variables Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected 
NEREGION 0.0445 0.0475 0.0463 0.0475 
(1.801) (1.922) (1 .943) ( 1.994) 
SREGION -0.0113 -0.0072 0.0122 0.0138 
(0.488) (0.310) (0.548) (0.617) 
WREGION -0.0321 -0.027 0.0232 0.0245 
(l .297) (1.100) (1.075) (1.137) 
BENEFIT - - 0.2684 0.2670 
(19.189) (19.024) 
LAMBDA - -0.2022 - -0.0873 
(2.453) (1.095) 
Ri 0.2495 0.2504 0.3028 0.3030 
No. obs 4635 4635 4635 4635 
F 85.23 81.15 11.13 10.56 
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Table B .3. Reduced Form Labor Demand Equation-Incidence of Own Employer Provided 
Health Insurance Benefits: CPS-Single Males and Females 1984, 1987, 1990. 
(t-ratios in parentheses) 
Probit Estimation: Dependent Variable=BENEFIT 
Male Female 
Variables Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected 
Intercept -3.6328 -3 .1000 -1.7642 -0.0205 
(3 .83 1) (3.106) (1. 797) (0.020) 
AGE 0.1189 0.1060 0.0353 0.0 138 
(6.270) (5.186) (1. 767) (0.677) 
AGE2 -0.00 12 -0.0009 -0.0002 0.00007 
(5.878) (4.092) (1.292) (0.377) 
HGA 0.1780 0.1710 0.2 181 0.0993 
(4.097) (3 .931) (3 .488) ( 1.496) 
HGA2 -0.0022 -0.0020 -0.0040 -0.0007 
(1.861) ( l .547) (2.343) (0.386) 
ED* AGE -0.00 10 -0.0012 -0.0004 -0.0004 
(1.486) ( 1.821) (0.489) (0.535) 
LNSTEARN 0.3717 0.2564 -0.7329 -0.7740 
(1.336) (0.897) (2.698) (0.535) 
METRO 0. 1052 0.1027 0.1261 0.1495 
(1.894) (1.839) (2.463) (2.902) 
TAX 0.0 137 0.0207 -0.0037 -0.0013 
(0.726) (1.073) (0.206) (0.07 1) 
PURATE 0.0032 0.016 1 0.0262 0.0537 
(0.171) (0.804) (1.520) (2.987) 
RURATE 0.0306 0.0356 -0.2645 0.0047 
(1.140) (1.322) (0.172) (0.169) 
PJOBGRO -0.0 J 76 -0.0125 0.0047 0.0326 
(0.613) (0.434) (0.742) ( 1.259) 
RSHOCK 0.02 15 0.0214 -0.0 190 0.0086 
(1.796) (1. 791) (0.197) (0.715) 
LNDAYHOS -0.1065 -0. 11 77 0.0928 0.0300 
(0.897) (0.990) (0.784) (0.252) 
BLACK -0.1480 -0.0994 -0. 11 41 -0.1593 
(2.23 1) (1.377) (2.013) (2.779) 
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Table B.3. (continued) 
Probit Estimation: Dependent Variable=BE EFIT 
Male Female 
Variables Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected 
LNPLAND -0.0438 -0.0469 0.0393 0.0369 
(1.230) ( 1.3 16) (J .098) ( 1.028) 
NEREGJON 0.0149 0.0079 -0.0239 0.0 198 
(0.190) (0. 101) (0.3 19) (0.262) 
SREGION -0.1847 -0 2232 -0.1934 -0.1652 
(2.436) (2.821) (2.634) (2.421) 
WREGIO -0.1671 -0.1190 -0. 1921 -0.1561 
(2.150) (2.291) (2.543) (2.053) 
LAMBDA -0 7477 -1.4571 
(I. 709) (5 .793) 
Log-Likeihood -2585.647 -2587. 181 -2600.926 -2584.063 
No. obs 4508 4508 4635 4635 
Chi-Squared 328.78(18) 33 1.7 1( 19) 213.99( 18) 247.71(19) 
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Table B.4. Reduced Form Labor Supply Equation CPS-Single Males 1984, 1987, 1990. 
(t-ratios in parentheses) 
OLS Estimation: Dependent Variable=LNHOURS 
Variables Benefits Endogenous Benefits Exogenous 
Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected 
Intercept 7.3625 7.53 19 7.6689 7.7489 
(16.790) (16.947) (22.056) (22 .015) 
AGE 0.0311 0.0386 0.0191 0.0237 
(4.682) (5.217) (2.995) (3 .329) 
AGE2 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0003 0.0004 
(6.008) (5.973) (4.589) (4 .356) 
HGA 0.0151 0.0167 -0.0080 -0.0069 
(1 .032) ( 1.136) (0.568) (0.487) 
HGA2 -0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0004 -0.0006 
(1.861) (2.340) (l.008) (1 .321) 
ED* AGE 0.0005 0.0008 0.0007 0.0008 
(2.381) (3 .156) (3 .106) (3 .428) 
LNSTEARN -0.0068 0.0464 -0.0466 -0.0159 
(0.778) (0.573) (0.647) (0.213) 
LNPLAND 0.0194 0.0228 0.0202 0.0223 
( 1.348) (1.982) (1.85 1) (2.022) 
METRO 0.0237 0.0249 0.0124 0.0127 
(0.35 1) (1 .343) (0.736) (0.753) 
TAX 0.0022 -0.0035 0.0003 -0.0031 
(1.3 1 l) (0.520) (0.056) (0.494) 
PURATE -0.0 I 09 -0.0 169 -0.0102 -0.0141 
(1.391) (2.180) (1.483) (1.899) 
RURATE -0.0153 -0.02 11 -0.0159 -0.0191 
(1.868) (2.978) (2.836) (3 .171) 
PJOBGRO -0.0061 -0.0054 0.0010 0.0010 
(0.485) (0.593) (0. 133) (0.128) 
RJOBGRO -0.0022 -0.0018 -0.0038 -0.0035 
(0.621) (0.467) (1.055) (0.970) 
LNDAYHOS -0.0045 -0.0107 
(0.101 ) (0.244) 
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Table B.4. (continued) 
OLS Estimation: Dependent Yariable=LNHOURS 
Variables Benefits Endogenous Benefi tsExogenou s 
Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected 
LNASVAL -0.0689 -0.1044 -0.0708 0.09 18 
(2.237) (3 .029) (2.421) (2.815) 
FKIDSU6 0.0316 0.0549 0.027 -0.0413 
(1.106) ( 1.81 1) (1.000) ( 1.427) 
PB LACK -0.0915 -0.1336 0.074 -0.0994 
(3. 783) (4.405) (3 .202) (3.431) 
FPERSONS -0.0277 -0.0483 -0.0218 -0.0343 
(4.530) (4.453) (3 .722) (3 .299) 
BENEFIT 0.31135 0.3103 
(20.020) (19.932) 
LAMBDA 0.6656 0.4028 
(2.298) ( 1.452) 
Ri 0.0475 0.0545 0. 1319 0.1314 
No. obs 5389 4508 4508 4508 
F 14.88 13.62 37.59 35 .73 
JOI 
Table B.5 . Reduced Form Labor Supply Equation: CPS-Single Females 1984, 1987, 1990. 
(t-ratios in parentheses) 
OLS Estimation: Dependent Variable=LNHOURS 
Variables Benefits Endogenous Benefits Exogenous 
Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected 
Intercept 8.0617 8.0529 7.8353 7.8295 
(17.517) (17.487) (20.572) (20.552) 
AGE 0.0235 0.0223 0.0192 0.0177 
(3.463) (3 . 137) (2.984) (2.619) 
AGE2 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 
(4.235) (3 .161) (3 .912) (2.782) 
HGA 0.0394 0.0303 0.0123 0.0003 
(1.992) (1.184) (0.644) (0.011) 
HGA2 -0.0395 -0.0003 -0.0003 0.0001 
(1.566) (0.739) (0.524) (0.154) 
ED* AGE 0.00007 -0.00002 0.00005 0.000009 
(0.029) (0.09 1) (0.202) (0.036) 
LNSTEARN -0.0764 -0.0819 -0.0287 -0.0352 
(0.961) (1 .023) (0.411) (0.500) 
LNPLAND -0.0023 -0.0027 -0.0093 -0.0098 
(0.205) (0.237) (0.852) (0.895) 
METRO 0.0015 0.0172 0.0006 0.0037 
(0.835) (0.938) (0.037) (0.217) 
TAX -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0020 -0.0021 
(0.129) (0.146) (0.329) (0.353) 
PURATE 0.0023 0.0038 -0.0005 0.0016 
(0.330) (0.515) (0.069) (0.222) 
RURATE -0.0146 -0.0 138 -0.0149 -0.0 140 
(2.159) (2.005) (2.745) (2.519) 
PJOBGRO 0.0021 0.0026 0.0012 0.0019 
(0.243) (0.295) (0.168) (0.264) 
RJOBGRO -0.0023 -0.0016 -0.0029 -0.0019 
(0.574) (0.364) (0.768) (0.482) 
LNDAYHOS -0.0189 -0.0181 
(0.442) (0.423) 
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Table 8 .5. (continued) 
OLS Estimation Dependent Variable=LNHOUR 
Variables Benefits Endogenous Benefits Exogenous 
Uncorrected Corrected Uncorrected Corrected 
LNASVAL -0. 11 26 -0. 10 13 -0.0932 -0.0373 
(3 .315) (2.561) (2.907) (2. 106) 
FKTDSU6 -0.0653 -0.0512 -0.0649 -0.0466 
(2.661) (1.460) (2.782) (1 .399) 
PB LACK -0.0137 -0.0203 -0.0050 -0 0136 
(0.662) (0.854) (0.255) (0.604) 
FPERSO s -0.0391 -0.0339 -0.0245 -0.0178 
(5.989) (3 .000) (3 .931) (J 654) 
BENEFIT 0.3472 0.3473 
(21.997) (22.001) 
LAMBDA -0.1246 -0.1617 
(0.563) (0.768) 
R1 0.0348 0.0348 0.1263 0. 1264 
No. obs 4635 4635 4635 4635 
F 9.24 8.78 37.08 35 .16 
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APPENDIX C. DAT A SOURCES 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. Significant Features of Fiscal 
Federalism 1983 Edition Volume IT, February 1984. ACIR, M -146 II. 
Variable 
1983 TAX 
Source Variable 
State-local individual income revenue as a 
percentage of personal income 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations . Significant Features of Fiscal 
Federalism 1986 Edition Volume II, August 1987. ACIR, M-163 II. 
Variable 
1986 TAX 
Source Variable 
State-local individual income revenue as a 
percentage of personal income 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. Significant Features of Fiscal 
Federalism 1989 Edition Volume II, September 1991. ACIR, M-180-II. 
Variable 
1989 TAX 
Source Variable 
State-local individual income revenue as a 
percentage of personal income 
Agriculture Resources. Agriculture Land Values and Markets. Situation and Outlook 
Report, 1991. 
Variable 
1986 PL AND 
1989 PLAND 
Source Variable 
Average Value of farm real estate land and 
buildings per acre 
Average value of farm real estate land and 
building per acre 
104 
American Hospital Association. Hospital Statistics Annual. Chicago, IL, 1985. 
Variable 
1983 DAYHOS 
Variable Source 
Average cost per day to community 
hospitals per patient 
Health Insurance Association of America. Source Book of Health Insurance Data, 
1989. 
1986 DAYHOS Average cost per day to community hospital 
per patient 
Health Insurance Association of America. Source Book of Health Insurance Dat~ 
1992. 
1989 DAYHOS Average cost per day to community hospital 
per patient 
U .S. Dept. of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. Farm Real Estate Market 
Developments, 1985. 
Variable 
1983 PL AND 
Source Variable 
Average Value of farm real estate land and 
buildings per acre 
U .S. Dept of Commerce, Bureau ofthe Census. Current Population Survey: Annual 
Demographic File [Computer file] . Washington D .C .: U.S. Dept. of the Census 
[Producer], 1984. 
1984 
Variable 
HOURS 
WAGE 
BENEFIT 
AGE 
HGA 
METRO 
PEMPSTAT 
ASVAL 
Source Variable 
I34WK * 138 
I515N(134WK *138) 
PAIDGH {All or Part] 
AGE 
HIGH GRAD 
CCCSMSA [Central City or Balance MSA] 
134>0 or I38>0 
I53B + 153C 
Variable 
HKIDSU6 
BLACK 
HPERSONS 
REGION 
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Source Variable 
FOWNU6 
RACE [Black] 
FPERSONS 
REGION [NE,S, W] 
U.S. Dept of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Current Population Survey: Annual 
Demographic File [Computer file]. Washington D .C.: U.S. Dept of the Census 
[Producer] , 1987. 
1987 
Vari ab.le 
HOURS 
WAGE 
BENEFIT 
AGE 
HGA 
METRO 
PEMPSTAT 
ASVAL 
HKIDSU6 
BLACK 
HPERSONS 
REGION 
Source Variable 
134WK * 138 
l515N(I34WK*I38) 
PAIDGH [All or Part] 
AGE 
HIGH GRAD 
CCCSMSA [Central City or Balance MSA] 
I34>0 or 138>0 
I53B + 153C 
FOWNU6 
RACE [Black] 
FPERSONS 
REGION [NE,S,W] 
U.S. Dept of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Current Population Survey: Annual 
Demographic File [Computer fi le]. Washington D.C.: U.S . Dept. of the Census 
[Producer], 1990. 
1990 
Variable 
HOURS 
WAGE 
BENEFIT 
AGE 
HGA 
METRO 
PEMPSTAT 
ASVAL 
HKIDSU6 
BLACK 
Source Variable 
WKSWORK*HRSWK 
WSAL V AL/(WKSWORK * HRSWK) 
PA YEMP [All or Part] 
A-AGE 
A-GHA 
HGMSR>O 
WKSWORK>O or HRSWK>O 
fNTV AL + RNTV AL + DIVV AL 
FOWNU6 
A-RACE 
Variable 
HPERSONS 
REGION 
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Source Variable 
FPERSONS 
HG-REG [NW,S,W } 
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Employment and Earnings. 
( 1985) 3 1 no. 5. 
Variable 
1983 JOBGRO 
1983 STEARN 
1983 URATE 
Source Variable 
Number of non-farm employed persons by 
state 
Average earnings of production workers on 
manufacturing payroll s in states 
Unemployment rate of civilian non-
institutionalized population 
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Employment and Earnings. 
( 1988) 34 no. 6 . 
Variable 
1986 JOBGRO 
1986 STEARN 
1986 URA TE 
Source Vari able 
Number of non-farm employed persons by 
state 
Average earnings of production workers on 
manufacturing payrolls in states 
Unemployment rate of civilian non-
institutionalized population 
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Employment and Earnings . 
( 1990) 37 no. 5. 
Variable 
1989 JOBGRO 
1989 STEARN 
Source Variable 
Number of non-farm employed persons by 
state 
Average earnings of production workers on 
manufacturing payrolls in states 
1989 URATE 
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Unemployment rate of civilian non-
institutionalized population 
U.S. Internal Revenue Service. Statistics ofincome Bulletin. (Summer 1985). 
Variable 
1983 TAX 
Source Variable 
Federal individual income tax data by state 
and size of adjusted gross income. 
U.S. Internal Revenue Service. Statistics oflncome Bulletin. (Spring 1988). 
Variable 
1986 TAX 
Source Variable 
Federal individual income tax data by state 
and size of adjusted gross income. 
U.S. Internal Revenue Service. Statistics oflncome Bulletin. (Summer 1991). 
Variable 
1989 TAX 
Source Variable 
Federal individual income tax data by state 
and size of adjusted gross income 
institutionalized population 
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APPENDIX D. PROGRAM SOURCE 
DATA SOURCE 
U .S. Dept of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Current Population Survey: Annual 
Demographic File [Computer file]. Washington D.C.: U. S. Dept. of the Census 
[Producer], annual 1982-1987, 1989-1991. 
Computer Programs 
MATCHUP. Moline, IL: Deere and Company, 1977. 
SAS Version 5. Cary, NC: SAS Institute Inc, 1985. 
SYNCSORT OS Release 2.5. Woodcliff Lake, NJ: Syncsort Inc., 1983 . 
PROGRAMJCL 
The following programs were run on an ·mM AS400 type mainframe computer. The 
programs are those used to sort and transform the CPS data used in Tables 1.2 through 1.7. 
All other operations were performed using simple spreadsheet operations. 
Years: 1982,1984-1987. 
l/MAINl JOB WAW$Sl ,WAWS1 
llS2 EXEC SYMSORT 
llSORTIN DD UN1T=(T APE,,DEFER),DISP=(OLD,KEEP), 
II LABEL=(2,SL),VOL=SER=PETER6,DSN=DATA.S8192 
llSORTOUT DD DSN=S1$WAW.PART3B84,DISP=(NEW,CATLG), 
II UNIT=DISK,SPACE=(TRK,(200,50),RLSE),VOL=SER=PUBOOl , 
11 DCB=(RECFM=FB,LRECL=48,BLKSIZE=234 72) 
llSYSIN DD* 
INREC FIELDS=( I,6,50, 1,63,9, 
354,6,457, 1,458, 1,464,2, 
466, 1,467, 11 ,636, 1,451 ) 1, 
687, 1,688, 1,689, 1,690, 1, 
692, 1,694, 1,696,1,697,1) 
OMJT COND=( 451 , 1 ,CH,EQ,C'O') 
SORT FIELDS=(l ,6,CH,A) 
OUTREC FIELDS=(l : 1,48) 
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//SS EXEC SAS, TIME=(8,40),REGION=4000K, WORK=' 1000, l 000' 
//INl DD DSN=S1$WAW.PART3B84,UNTT=DISK,DISP= SHR 
//OUTl DD DSN=S l$WAW.PART484,DISP=(NEW,CATLG),UNIT=DISK, 
II SPACE=(TRK,(200,50),RLSE), VOL=SER=PUB006, 
II DCB=(RECFM=FB,LRECL=40,BLKSIZE=23440) 
llSYSINDD * 
DATA ONE; 
INFILE IN1 ; 
INPUT HSEQNUM 1-6 CCCMSA 7 HHINCTOT 8-16 PPSEQNUM 17-22 SEX 23 
RACE 24 HGA 25-26 HGC 27 MARSUPW $ 28-38 RSEMPST 39 
POPSTAT 40 INCINGH 41PAIDGH42 WHOELSGH 43 COVERGH 44 
COVMEDCR 45 COYMEDCD 46 COVERCP 47 COVERID 48; 
DATA TWO; SET ONE; 
IF CCCMSA=3 THEN METRO=O; ELSE METRO=l ; 
IF HHINCTOT LT 12500 THEN HJNCOME=O; 
ELSE IF HHINCTOT GT 12499 AND HHINCTOT LT 20000 THEN HINCOME= l ; 
ELSE IF HHINCTOT GT 19999 AND HHINCTOT LT 26000 THEN HINCOME=2; 
ELSE IF HHINCTOT GT 25999 AND HHINCTOT LT 35000 THENIITNCOME=3; 
ELSE IF HHINCTOT GT 34999 AND HHINCTOT LT 45000 THEN HINCOME=4; 
ELSE IF HHINCTOT GT 44999 AND HHINCTOT LT 75000 THEN HINCOME=5; 
ELSE IF HHINCTOT GT 74999 THEN HINCOME=6; 
ELSE HINCOME=O; 
IF HGA= 13 AND HGC= l OR HGA GT 13 THEN HIGHS=l ;ELSE HIGHS=O; 
IF HGA= l 7 AND HGC= l OR HGA GT 17 THEN COLLEGE=l ;ELSE COLLEGE=O; 
IF RSEMPST= l THEN EMPLOY=!; 
ELSE IF RSEMPST=2 THEN EMPLOY=2; 
ELSE EMPLOY=O; 
IF INCINGH=l THEN EMPGH=l ; ELSE EMPGH=O; 
IF WHOELSGH=O OR WHOELSGH=4 THEN OTHERGH=O ;ELSE OTHERGH= l ; 
IF COVMEDCD= l OR COVMEDCR= l OR COVERCP=l THEN COVGOVT= l ; 
ELSE COVGOVT=O; 
FILE OUTl ; 
PUT METRO 1HINCOME2 SEX 3 RACE 4 HIGHS 5 COLLEGE 6 MARSUPW 7-17 
EMPLOY 18 PO PST AT 19 EMPGH 20 PAIDGH 2 l OTHERGH 22 COVERGH 23 
COVGOVT 24 COVERID 25; 
//S6 EXEC S YMSORT 
/ISORTIN DD DSN=S 1$WAW.PART484,DISP=SHR 
//SORTOUT DD DSN=S1$WAW.PART584,DISP=(NEW,CATLG), 
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11 UNIT=DISK,SP ACE=(TRK,( l 00,50),RLSE), VOL=SER=PUBOO 1, 
II DCB=(RECFM=FB,LRECL=42,BLKSIZE=23436) 
llSYSIN DD * 
INREC FIELDS=( 1,6,C'OOO', 7, 19) 
OMIT COND=(19, 1, CH,EQ, C'2') 
SORT FIELDS=(l ,6,CH,A,21 ,8,CH,A) 
SUM FIELDS=(?, 14,ZD) 
OUTREC FIELDS=(l :1, 1,3:2, 1,5:3, 1,7:4, 1,9:5, 1, 11 :6, l , 
13 :7,14,28:21 , 1,30:22, 1,32:23, 1,34:24, 1, 
36:25, 1,3 8:26, 1,40:27, 1,42:28, l) 
llS7 EXEC SYMSORT 
llSORTIN DD DSN=Sl$WAW.PART584,DISP=SHR 
llSORTOUT DD DSN= Sl$WAW.PART684,DJSP=(NEW,CATLG), 
II UNlT=DISK,SPACE=(TRK,(100,50),RLSE), VOL=SER=PUB001 , 
11 DCB=(RECFM=FB,LRECL=22,BLKS1ZE=234 74) 
llSYSIN DD* 
INREC FIELDS=( l , 42) 
SORT FIELDS=(3, l ,CH,A,38, 1,CH,A,40, 1,CH,A,42, I,CH,A) 
SUM FIELDS=(13,14,ZD) 
OUTREC FIELDS=(l :3, 1,3 :38,1,5:40, 1,7:42,1,9:13, 14) 
llS8 EXEC SYMSORT 
llSORTIN DD DSN= S1$WAW.PART584,DISP=SHR 
llSORTOUT DD DSN=S1$WAW.PART784,DISP=(NEW,CATLG), 
II UNIT=DISK,SPACE=(TRK,(100,50),RLSE),VOL=SER=PUBOOl, 
II DCB=(RECFM=FB,LRECL=42,BLKSIZE=23436) 
llSYSINDD * 
INREC FIELDS=(l ,42) 
SORT FIELDS=(l , l ,CH,A,5, l ,CH,A,7,1,CH,A,9, l ,CH,A, 11 , 1,CH,A, 
28,1,CH,A,30, 1,CH,A,32, l ,CH,A,34, l ,CH,A, 
36,1 ,CH,A,38, l ,CH,A,40, l ,CH,A,42, 1,CH,A) 
SUM FIELDS=(13, 14,ZD) 
OUTREC FIELDS=( I : 1,42) 
Year: 1983 . 
/IMAINl JOB WAW$Sl ,WAWS1 
llSl EXEC SYMSORT 
llSORTIN DD UNIT=(T APE,,DEFER),DISP=(OLD,PASS), 
II LABEL=(l ,SL),VOL=SER=PETE12,DSN=DA8863 
llSORTOUT DD DSN=S1$WAW.PART184,DISP=(NEW,CATLG), 
II UNIT=DISK,SPACE=(TRK,(200,50),RLSE), VOL= SER=PUBOO l , 
111 
II DCB=(RECFM=FB,LRECL= l6,BLKSIZE=23472) 
//SYSIN DD* 
INREC FIELDS=(333, 1, 1,6,50, l ,72,9) 
OMIT COND=(33 l , l ,CH,NE,C'l') 
SORT FIELDS=(2,6,CH,A) 
OUTREC FIELDS=(l :2, 16) 
//S2 EXEC SYMSORT 
//SORTIN DD UNIT=(TAPE,,DEFER),DISP=(OLD,KEEP), 
II LABEL={l,SL),VOL=SER=PETEl 2,DSN=DA8863 
//SORTOUT DD DSN=Sl$WAW.PART284,DISP=(NEW,CATLG), 
II UNIT=DlSK,SPACE=(TRK,(200,50),RLSE),VOL=SER=PUBOOl , 
II DCB=(RECFM=FB,LRECL=32,BLKSIZE=23456) 
//SYSINDD * 
INREC FIELDS=(331 , 1, 1,6, 108, 1, 109, 1, 115,2, 117, 1, 118, 11 ,295, 1, 
102, 1,345, 1,346, 1,347,1,348, 1,350, 1,352, 1, 
354,1,356,1) 
OMIT COND=(331, 1,CH,NE,C'J') 
SORT FIELDS=(2,6,CH,A) 
OUTREC FIELDS=(l :2,32) 
//SJ EXEC MA TCHUP 
//MASTERIN DD DSN=Sl$WAW.PART284,DISP=SHR 
//SELECT DD DSN=S1$WAW.PARTl84,DISP=SHR 
//MATCH DD DSN=Sl$WAW.PART384,DISP=(NEW,CATLG), 
II UNIT=DISK,SPACE=(TRK,(200,50),RLSE), VOL=SER=PUB008, 
II DCB=(RECFM=FB,LRECL=48,BLKSIZE=23472) 
//NOMATCH DD DSN=Sl$WAW.REJ184,DISP=(NEW,CATLG), 
11 UNIT=DISK,SP ACE=(TRK,{100,25),RLSE), VOL=SER=PUB008, 
11 DCB=(RECFM=FB,LRECL=48,BLKSIZE=234 72) 
//NOHIT DD DSN=S I $WAW.REJ284,DISP=(NEW,CATLG), 
II UNIT=DISK,SPACE=(TRK,(100,25),RLSE),VOL=SER=PUB008, 
II DCB=(RECFM=FB,LRECL=48,BLKSIZE=23472) 
//SYSINDD * 
MASK(l , 1,6//33, 1, 16),ALL,ALLSEL 
//S4 EXEC SYMSORT 
//SOR TIN DD DSN=S 1 $WAW.P ART384,DISP=SHR 
//SORTOUT DD DSN=S1$WAW.PART3B84,DISP=(NEW,CATLG), 
II UNIT=DISK,SPACE=(TRK,(200,50),RLSE), VOL=SER=PUBOO 1, 
II DCB=(RECFM=FB,LRECL=48,BLKSIZE=23472) 
//SYSIN DD* 
INREC FIELDS=(l ,48) 
SORT FIELDS=(l ,48,CH,A) 
OUTREC FIELDS=(l :33,16,17:1,32) 
//SS EXEC SAS,TIME=(8,40),REGION=8000K,WORK='l000, I 000' 
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//IN! DD DSN=S1$WAW.PART3B84,UNIT=DISK,DISP=SHR 
llOUTl DD DSN=Sl $WAW.PART484,DISP=(NEW,CATLG),UN1T=DISK, 
II SPACE=(TRK,(200,50),RLSE), VOL=SER=PUB006, 
II DCB=(RECFM=FB,LRECL=40,BLKSIZE=23440) 
llSYSIN DD * 
DATA ONE; 
fNFILE INl ; 
INPUT HSEQNUM 1-6 CCCMSA 7 HHINCTOT 8-16 PPSEQNUM 17-22 SEX 23 
RACE 24 HGA 25-26 HGC 27 MARSUPW $ 28-38 RSEMPST 39 
POPSTAT 40 INCINGH 41 PAIDGH 42 WHOELSGH 43 COVERGH 44 
COVMEDCR 45 COVMEDCD 46 COVERCP 47 COVERHI 48; 
DATA TWO; SET ONE; 
IF CCCMSA=3 THEN METRO=O; ELSE METRO= J; 
IF HHINCTOT LT 12500 THEN HINCOME=O; 
ELSE IF HHINCTOT GT 12499 AND HHINCTOT LT 20000 THEN HINCOME= 1; 
ELSE IF HHINCTOT GT 19999 AND HHINCTOT LT 26000 THEN HINCOME=2; 
ELSE IF HHINCTOT GT 25999 AND HHINCTOT LT 35000 THEN HINCOME=3; 
ELSE IF HHINCTOT GT 34999 AND HIDNCTOT LT 45000 THEN HINCOME=4; 
ELSE IF HHINCTOT GT 44999 AND HHTNCTOT LT 75000 THEN HINCOME=5; 
ELSE IF HHINCTOT GT 74999 THEN H1NCOME=6; 
ELSE HINCOME=O; 
IF HGA= l3 AND HGC=l OR HGA GT 13 THEN HIGHS= I ;ELSE HIGHS=O; 
lF HGA= l 7 AND HGC= l OR HGA GT 17 THEN COLLEGE= l ;ELSE COLLEGE=O; 
IF RSEMPST= I THEN EMPLOY= I; 
ELSE IF RSEMPST=2 THEN EMPLOY=2; 
ELSE EMPLOY=O; 
IF INCINGH= l THEN EMPGH=l ; ELSE EMPGH=O; 
IF WHOELSGH=O OR WHOELSGH=4 THEN OTHERGH=O ;ELSE OTHERGH= l ; 
IF COVMEDCD= I OR COVMEDCR= l OR COVERCP=l THEN COVGOVT= l ; 
ELSE COVGOVT=O; 
FILE OUTl ; 
PUT METRO 1HINCOME2 SEX 3 RACE 4 HIGHS 5 COLLEGE 6 MARSUPW 7-17 
EMPLOY 18 POP ST AT 19 EMPGH 20 P AIDGH 21 OTHERGH 22 COVERGH 23 
COVGOVT 24 COVERID 25; 
llS6 EXEC SYMSORT 
llSORTIN DD DSN=S1$WAW.PART484,DISP=SHR 
llSORTOUT DD DSN=S1$WAW.PART584,DISP=(NEW,CATLG), 
II UNIT=DISK,SPACE=(TRK,(100,50),RLSE), VOL=SER=PUBOO l , 
II DCB=(RECFM=FB,LRECL=42,BLKSIZE=23436) 
llSYSIN DD* 
INREC FIELDS=(l ,6,C'000',7,19) 
OMIT COND=(19, l ,CH,EQ,C'2') 
SORT FIELDS=(l ,6,CH,A,21 ,8,CH,A) 
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SUM FIELDS=(?, 14,ZD) 
OUTREC FIELDS=(l: 1, 1,3:2, 1,5:3, 1,7:4, 1,9:5, 1, 11 :6,1, 
13 :7,14,28 :21' 1,30:22, 1,32:23, 1,34:24, 1, 
36:25, 1,38:26, 1,40:27, 1,42:28, 1) 
YEARS : 1989-1991. 
//MAlNl JOB WAW$Sl ,WAWS1 
//SI EXEC SYMSORT 
//SOR TIN DD UNIT=(T APE,,DEFER),DISP=(OLD,PASS), 
II LABEL=(l ,SL),VOL=SER=PETE15,DSN=DA9374 
II DD UNIT=(T APE,,DEFER),DISP=(OLD,PASS), 
II LABEL=(1,SL),VOL=SER=PETE16,DSN=DA9374 
//SORTOUT DD DSN=Sl$WAW.PART189,DISP=(NEW,CATLG), 
II UNIT=DISK,SPACE=(TRK,(200, 100),RLSE), VOL=SER=PUB004, 
II DCB=(RECFM=FB,LRECL=14,BLKSIZE=23464) 
//SYSIN DD* 
INREC FIELDS=(l , 1,2,5,58, 1,248,8) 
OMIT COND=( l , l ,CH,NE,C'l') 
SORT FIELDS=(2,5,CH,A) 
OUTREC FIELDS=(1 :2,14) 
//S2 EXEC SYMSORT 
//SOR TIN DD UNIT=(T APE,,DEFER),DISP=(OLD,KEEP), 
II LABEL=(l ,SL),VOL=SER=PETEl 5,DSN=DA9374 
II DD UNIT=(T APE,,DEFER),DISP=(OLD,KEEP), 
II LABEL=( l ,SL),VOL=SER=PETE16,DSN=DA9374 
//SORTOUT DD DSN=S1$WAW.PART289,DISP=(NEW,CATLG), 
II UNIT=DISK,SPACE=(TRK,(200, l 00),RLSE), VOL=SER=PUBOO 1, 
II DCB=(RECFM=FB,LRECL=3 l ,BLKSIZE=23467) 
//SYSIN DD* 
INREC FIELDS=( I , 1,2,5,20, 1,25, 1,22,2,24, 1,66,8, 149, 1, 
26, 1,474, 1,475, 1,476, 1,477, 1,478, 1,479, l , 
484, 1,469, 1,470, 1,471 , 1,485, 1) 
OMIT COND=(1 , I ,CH,NE,C'3') 
SORT FIELDS=(2,5,CH,A) 
OUTREC FIELDS=(l :2,31) 
//S3 EXEC MA TCHUP 
//MASTERIN DD DSN=S 1$WAW.PART289,DISP=SHR 
//SELECT DD DSN= S1$WAW.PART189,DISP=SHR 
//MATCH DD DSN=S1$WAW.PART389,DISP=(NEW,CATLG), 
II UNIT=DISK,SPACE=(TRK,(200, 100),RLSE), VOL=SER=PUB008, 
11 DCB=(RECFM=FB,LRECL=4 5 ,BLKSIZE=2344 5) 
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//NOMA TCH DD DSN=S 1$WAW.REJ189,DISP=(NEW,CATLG), 
II UNIT=DISK,SPACE=(TRK,(l 00,25),RLSE), VOL=SER=PUB008, 
II DCB=(RECFM=FB,LRECL=45,BLKSIZE=23445) 
//NOHIT DD DSN=S1$WAW.REJ289,DISP=(NEW,CATLG), 
II UNIT=DISK,SPACE=(TRK,( l 00,25),RLSE), VOL=SER=PUB008, 
II DCB=(RECFM=FB,LRECL=45,BLKSIZE=23445) 
//SYSIN DD * 
MASK(l , 1,5//32, 1, 14),ALL,ALLSEL 
//S4 EXEC SYMSORT 
//SORTIN DD DSN=S1$WAW.PART389,DISP=SHR 
//SORTOUT DD DSN=Sl$WAW.PART3B89,DISP=(NEW,CATLG), 
II UNIT=DISK,SP ACE=(TRK,(200,50), RLSE), VOL=SER=PUBOO I , 
II DCB=(RECFM=FB,LRECL=45,BLKSIZE=23445) 
//SYSIN DD * 
INREC FIELDS=(l ,45) 
SORT FIELDS=(l ,45,CH,A) 
OUTREC FIELDS=(l :32, 14, 15: 1,3 1) 
//SS EXEC SAS,TIME=(8,40),REGJON=4000K,WORK=' 1000, 1000' 
//INl DD DSN=S1$WAW.PART3B89,UN1T=DISK,DISP=SHR 
//OUTl DD DSN=Sl$WAW.PART489,DISP=(NEW,CATLG),UNIT=DJSK, 
II SPACE=(TRK,(200,50),RLSE), VOL=SER=PUB007, 
II DCB=(RECFM=FB,LRECL=40,BLKSIZE=23440) 
//SYSINDD * 
DATA ONE; 
INFILE INl ; 
INPUT HSEQ 1-5 HCCCR 6 HHINCTOT 7- 14 PHSEQ 15-19 SEX 20 
ARACE 21HGA22-23 HGC 24 MARSUPW $ 25-32 WKSTAT 33 
PSTAT 34 HIEMP 35 lllPAID 36 HIELSEl 37 HIELSE2 38 
HIELSE3 39 HIELSE4 40 COVGH 41 MCARE 42 MCAID 43 
CHAMPUS 44 COVHT 45; 
DATA TWO; SET ONE; 
IF HCCCR=3 THEN METRO=O; ELSE METRO=l ; 
IF HHINCTOT LT 12500 THEN HINCOME=O; 
ELSE IF HHINCTOT GT 12499 AND HHINCTOT LT 20000 THEN HINCOME= l ; 
ELSE IF HHINCTOT GT 19999 AND HHINCTOT LT 26000 THEN HlNCOME=2; 
ELSE IF ID-IINCTOT GT 25999 AND HHINCTOT LT 35000 THEN HINCOME=3; 
ELSE IF HHINCTOT GT 34999 AND I-ll-IINCTOT LT 45000 THEN HINCOME=4; 
ELSE IF HHINCTOT GT 44999 AND HHINCTOT LT 75000 THEN HJNCOME=5; 
ELSE IF HHINCTOT GT 74999 THEN HINCOME=6; 
ELSE HINCOME=O; 
lF ARA CE= I THEN RACE= 1; 
ELSE IF ARACE=2 THEN RACE=2; 
ELSE RACE=3; 
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IF HGA= l2 AND HGC= l OR HGA GT 12 THEN IDGHS= l ;ELSE HIGHS=O; 
IF HGA= l 6 AND HGC= l OR HGA GT 16 THEN COLLEGE= I ;ELSE COLLEGE=O; 
IF WKST AT=2 THEN EMPLOY= 1; 
ELSE IF WKSTAT>2 AND WKSTAT<6 THEN EMPLOY=2; 
ELSE EMPLOY=O; 
IF HIEMP= 1 THEN EMPGH= 1; ELSE EMPGH=O; 
IF HIELSEl =l OR HIELSE2= 1 OR HIELSE3= 1 OR HIELSE4=1 
THEN OTHERGH= l ;ELSE OTHERGH=O; 
IFMCARE= l ORMCAID=l ORCHAMPUS= l THEN COVGOVT= I; 
ELSE COVGOVT=O; 
FILE OUTl ; 
PUT METRO 1 HINCOME 2 SEX 3 RACE 4 IDGHS 5 COLLEGE 6 MARSUPW 7-14 
EMPLOY 15 PSTAT 16 EMPGH 17 IDPAID 18 OTHERGH 19 COVGH 20 
COVGOVT 21COVID 22; 
llS6 EXEC SYMSORT 
llSORTIN DD DSN=S1$WAW.PART489,DISP=SHR 
llSORTOUT DD DSN=Sl$WAW.PART589,DISP=(NEW,CATLG), 
II UNIT=DISK,SPACE=(TR.K,(100,50),RLSE), VOL=SER=PUBOO 1, 
II DCB=(RECFM=FB,LRECL=42,BLKSIZE=23436) 
llSYSIN DD * 
INREC FIELDS=( 1,6,C'OOOOOO', 7, 16) 
OMIT COND=(19,1,CH,EQ,C'2') 
SORT FIELDS=(l ,6,CH,A,21 ,8,CH,A) 
SUM FIELDS=(?, 14,ZD) 
OUTREC FIELDS=(l: 1, 1,3 :2, 1,5:3, 1,7:4, 1,9:5, 1, 11:6, 1, 
13:7' 14,28:21 , 1,30:22, 1,32:23, 1,34 :24,1, 
36:25, 1,38:26, 1,40:27, l,42:28, I) 
llS7 EXEC SYMSORT 
llSORTIN DD DSN=S1$WAW.PART589,DISP=SHR 
llSORTOUT DD DSN=Sl$WAW.PART689,DISP=(NEW,CATLG), 
II UNIT=DISK,SPACE=(TRK,(100,50),RLSE), VOL=SER=PUBOO 1, 
II DCB=(RECFM=FB,LRECL=22,BLKSIZE=23474) 
llSYSIN DD * 
INREC FIELDS=(l ,42) 
SORT FIELDS=(3, l , CH,A,3 8, 1, CH,A, 40, 1 ,CH,A,42, I, CH,A) 
SUM FIELDS=( 13, 14,ZD) 
OUTREC FIELDS=(l :3, 1,3:38, 1,5:40, 1,7:42, 1,9: 13, 14) 
llS8 EXEC SYMSORT 
l/SORTIN DD DSN=Sl$WAW.PART589,DISP=SHR 
l/SORTOUT DD DSN=S1$WAW.PART789,DISP=(NEW,CATLG), 
II UN1T=DISK,SPACE=(TR.K,(100,50),RLSE),VOL=SER=PUB001 , 
II DCB=(RECFM=FB,LRECL=42,BLKSIZE=23436) 
/ISYSIN DD * 
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INREC FIELDS=( l ,42) 
SORT FIELDS=(l , 1, CH,A,5, 1, CH,A, 7, l ,CH,A, 9, 1,CH,A, I I, I, CH,A, 
28, l ,CH,A,30, 1,CH,A,32, 1,CH,A,34 , 1,CH,A, 
36, 1,CH,A,38, l ,CH,A,40, 1,CH,A,42, l ,CH,A) 
SUM FIELDS=(13, 14,ZD) 
OUTREC FlELDS=(l : 1,42) 
